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ABSTRACT
This article explores the legal implications of having a military
pilot from the armed forces of one nation serve as the aircraft

commander on a foreign flagged state aircraft, focusing on the
organizational structure of the multinational "Strategic Airlift

Capability" (SAC) Consortium-a multinational partnership
formed in 2006 to meet the strategic airlift requirements of its
* Mr. Petras (B.A., University of Dayton; J.D., Samford University; LL.M.,
McGill University) is currently a Legal Officer with the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), Legal Affairs and External Relations Bureau, in
Montreal. Prior to joining ICAO, he was an officer and attorney in the U.S. Air
Force for over 20 years and, from 2008 to 2011, served as Chief Legal Counsel to
the 618th Air and Space Operations Center (Tanker Airlift Control Center) at
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois-the Air Force's largest air operations center,
providing command and control of American military and commercial contract
air mobility assets worldwide. He is a member of the Bar in the state of Alabama.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author. They
are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes,
or policies of ICAO, nor any branch or agency of the U.S. Government.
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twelve participant nations. The article begins with an overview
of the SAC Consortium, which is followed by an examination of
the issue of the status of state aircraft under international law, as
reflected in the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, better known as the Chicago Convention. It then takes up
the subject of the legal authority of the military aircraft commander and considers the sources of this authority, showing
how the authority of the military aircraft commander under international law makes the position distinct from other command positions in multinational military settings. Next, the
article looks at the legal status of military aircraft and military
aircraft commander authority within the context of the SAC
Consortium, highlighting how legal complexities in these areas
could undermine the effectiveness of this new international arrangement for the collective operation of the partnership's
three Boeing C-17 aircraft. The article then proposes an alternative structure for the SAC Consortium that could remedy the
legal pitfalls of the current arrangement, before finally offering
some concluding comments. The purposes of this piece are
two-fold: (1) to show how both the legal status of state (military)
aircraft and their function as sovereign instrumentalities serve to
define the status and authority of the military aircraft commander under international law; and (2) to show how the prospect of commanding over a foreign flagged aircraft and, in
particular, a foreign flagged "air mobility" aircraft like the C-17
is especially problematic in the case of the SAC Consortium, due
to the vagaries of their aircraft's legal character and the potential for conflict between the aircraft commander's role as an officer in the armed forces of his or her sending state and their
responsibilities as the de facto representative of the aircraft's
"territorial sovereign."
I.

INTRODUCTION

66 O VER THE NEXT four years, [the U.S. Department of
..,Defense (DoD)] plans to spend about $12 billion to
modernize and procure [airlift aircraft] and is currently studying how many [and what kind] it needs."' In this equation, foreign military sales of the Boeing C-1 7 GlobemasterIll-whether to
I U.S.

Gov'T ACCOUNTAILIx OFFICE,

GAO-10-67,

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: STRA-

TEGIC AIRLIFT GAP HAS BEEN ADDRESSED, BUT TACTICAL AIRLIFT PiANs ARE EVOLVING AS KEY ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED 1, 2 (2009), available at http://

www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-67.
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states individually or as a collective-have been advanced as a
means of potentially "reduc[ing] allied nations' demand on U.S.
strategic airlift platforms in future operations. ' 2 At the same
time, governments within Europe and elsewhere are endeavoring "to improve their strategic airlift capabilities," whether it's
because they recognize the ability to rapidly move and sustain
forces as critical to success in modern military engagements, or
want to increase participation in future humanitarian or disaster
relief missions, or both. And for many of these nations, pooling resources is seen as a cost-effective way to "address airlift
capability shortfalls in [today's] restrictive budgetary environment."4
Against this backdrop, the approach of the Strategic Airlift
Capability (SAC) partnership to shared use of strategic airlift is
being touted as a model for the collective acquisition and management of these assets. 5 The SAC partnership is a multinational consortium that was formed in 2006 to meet strategic
airlift requirements of its twelve participant nations.6 The SAC's
operational arm, the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), is headquartered at Papa Airbase in Hungary and operates a fleet of three
C-17s, flying missions on behalf of the SAC participants-including missions in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 7 the European Union (EU), and the United
Nations (UN) .
2

See

WILLIAM KNIGHT & CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM,

CONG. RESEARCH

SERV.,

RL

34264 STRATEGIC AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION: ANALYSIS OF
C-17 ACQUISITION ISSUES, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 34
(2007); see also MajorJames D. Hood, NATO StrategicAirlift: Capability or Continued
US Reliance? 13 (2009), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA539589 (noting that
"[d] ue to a lack of European strategic airlift capability, the United States supported 29 European nations with over 900 airlift missions transporting more than
20,000 short tons of cargo in 2007 alone").
3 See Katia Vlachos-Dengler, Cany That Weight: Improving European Strategic Airlift Capabilities,PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL 1-5 (2007), http://www.rand.
org/pubs/rgs-dissertations/2007/RANDRGSD219.pdf.
4 Id. at iii, 114-16; see also KNIGHT & BOLKCOM, supra note 2, at 35.
5 Press Release, NATO, Strategic Airlift Capability Moves to Implementation
(Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/pO8-124e.html.
6 See NATO, Strategic Airlift Capability: A Key Capability for the Alliance, http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics-50105.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2011).
"The participants include ten NATO nations (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the United States)
and two Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations (Finland and Sweden)." Id.
7 Press Release, U.S. Air Forces in Europe Public Affairs, Multinational Strategic Airlift Consortium Completes First Flight in Support of ISAF (Oct. 1, 2009),
C-5

MODERNIZATION

AND
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Under the terms of the SAC implementing arrangement, participant nations are allocated a share of the HAW's estimated
3,100 yearly flying hours, and are, in turn, obligated to contribute military personnel to the unit in ratios commensurate with
their proportionate investments in the program.8 But regardless
of which SAC participant is the benefactor, HAW missions are
flown by multinational crews, with pilots coming primarily from
the Norwegian, Swedish, and U.S. armed forces.9 At the same
time, in addition to being based in Papa, SAC aircraft are registered by, and bear the military ensign of, the Republic of Hungary." The HAW's organizational and command structure thus
requires that the military officers piloting the unit's C-17s, in
fact, operate and serve as aircraft commanders over what are
ostensibly Hungarian "state aircraft" within the meaning of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, commonly
referred to as the Chicago Convention."

available at http://www.eucom.mil/article/20132/multinational-strategic-airliftconsortium-flight.
8 See Cristin Marposon, 12-Nation Heavy Airlift Wing Fakes Flight with First C-I 7,
AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS TODAY (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.usafe.af.
mil/news/storyprint.asp?id=123158912.
9 Id.
10 See Marcus Weisgerber, Team Airlift, AIR FORCE, June 2009, at 38, 40. HAW
aircraft are marked with the Hungarian Air Force's triangular roundels and a tail
flash consisting of a blue strip across the vertical stabilizer bearing the name
"Papa" and red, white, and green stripes (i.e., the colors of the Hungarian flag)
across the rudder. Id. at 40.
11 See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Strategic Airlift Capability
(SAC), opened for signature Mar. 11, 2008, U.S. Dep't of State, Treaty Affairs doc.
No. 129827 §§ 14.1, 19.1, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/129827.pdf [hereinafter SAC MOU]; see also Convention on International
Civil Aviation art. 3, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter
Chicago Convention].
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SAC C-17s are marked with the Hungarian Air Force's triangular roundel
(Photo: http://Nmvw.usafe.af.mil).

Of course, for many SAC participants (ten of whom are also
NATO members), multinational operations are nothing new.
The United States, for one, enjoys a centuries-long tradition of
fighting alongside allied nations dating back to the American
Revolution. 12 Thus, the United States has well-established
guidelines for forces participating in multinational organizations with alliance or coalition members, which ensure national
legal limitations on foreign command and control of American
troops are taken into account whenever they operate tnder an
integrated command structure."' Consequently, "U.S. military
forces can and have been subordinated to foreign control with
12

See Christopher J. Makins, Foreword to MWI-AL A. CANNA,

COMMAND AND

CONTROL OF MUITINATIONAL OPERIONS INVOLVING U.S. MILITAuzv FORCES, at

vii

(The Atlantic Counsel of the United States 2004), available at http:!/www.isn.
ethz.ch/isn/Digital-LibrarT/Publications/Detail/?ots591 0C54E3B3-1E9C,-BEIE2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng-en&id= 10616.
13 See, e.g., Executive Summary: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations § V (U.S, Dep't of State 1994), reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 705 (1994), available at http:/www-AT.state.gov/Vwv/issues/un_clinton_
policy.html [hereinafter Exec. Summary]; Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dep't of State Statement on the Legal Authority for UN Peace Operations (Mar.
3, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 821, 829 (1994); Statement by the Press Secretary
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 30 WEIEL CoMP. PRES. Doc. 998
(May 5, 1994); OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINTI CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT
PrnLICAI [ON 3-16: JoINr DOCTRINE FOR MUt tINATIONAL OPERATIONS Vii (2000).
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little concern for the loss of national control this action may
imply."' 4
However, the experience of the United States and other SAC
participant nations with multinational military operations notwithstanding, due to the special status of state aircraft under international law, the notion of a pilot from one nation's armed
services serving as aircraft commander on a foreign flagged state
aircraft elicits legal concerns that go beyond the command-authority issues typically associated with combined military
forces.15 Like warships, state aircraft that have received authorization to enter the territory of another state enjoy sovereign immunity from interference by the authorities of the foreign
nation, including immunity from foreign search and inspection. 6 In addition, as sovereign instrumentalities, state aircraft
are, in effect, a territorial extension of the flag nation and activities on board the aircraft are thus under its exclusive jurisdiction. 7 By international custom and practice, both the
responsibility to enforce sovereign immunity and the authority
to exercise jurisdiction of the flag nation inure to the aircraft
14 CANNA, supra note 12, at 34; see generally id. app. (listing "Examples of U.S.
Military Forces Subordination to Foreign Military Control"); see also RUSSELL J.
PARKINSON, FOREIGN COMMAND OF U.S. FORCES (DAMH-RAS Feb. 25, 1993), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/pl76.pdf.
15 See generally CANNA, supra note 12, at 3-8 (discussing the law and policy governing command and control of U.S. forces during multinational contingency
operations).

16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 457 n.7 (1987) [hereinafter
U.S.

RESTATEMENT 3D, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw];

DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

EIGN CLEARANCE PROGRAM

FOR-

(FCP) 2 (2009) [hereinafter DoDD 4500.54E]; U.S.

DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANUAL
ANCE MANUAL,

see also

4500.54E, DoD

C2.1.5 (2009) [hereinafter

4500.54,

FOREIGN CLEAR-

FOREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL]; U.S.

DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NAVAL WARFARE PUBLICATION

1-14M,

THE COMMANDER'S

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
2.4.2 (2007) [hereinafter NAVAL
WARFARE PUB. 1-14M]; U.S. AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S DEP'T, AIR

FORCE OPERATIONS & THE LAw

71 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter USAF OPs LAw

HANDBOOK].
17

Cf JOHN B.

MOORE,

A DIGEST

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EMBODIED IN DIPLO-

MATIC DISCUSSIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL AWARDS, THE DECISIONS OF MUNICIPAL COURTS, AND THE WRITINGS OF
JURISTS, AND ESPECIALLY IN DOCUMENTS, PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED, ISSUED BY
THE PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE OPINIONS
OF THE ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, AND THE DECISIONS OF COURTS, FEDERAL AND STATE

930-37 (1906) (discussing the jurisdictional status of warships) [hereinafter DIGEST OF INT'L LAw]; see also Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND
VALUES

234 (1995).
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commander."8 A military pilot commanding over a foreign flagged state aircraft must therefore simultaneously serve multiple
interrelated but potentially conflicting roles-i.e., that of a
member of the armed forces of the pilot's sending state and that
of the de facto representative of the aircraft's "territorial
sovereign.'"1
This is not to suggest that the concept of multinational aircraft operations is unique to the HAW. For example, the NATO
Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) E-3A
Component, established in 1982, is comprised of military personnel from fourteen member nations.20 It operates seventeen
Boeing E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft out of its Main Operating Base in Geilenkirchen, Germany. 21 Like the SAC C-17s, the NATO AWACS aircraft are
manned by multinational crews and piloted by officers from militaries other than that of the flag nation for the aircraft-i.e.,
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 22 Notably, however, NATO
officials selected Luxembourg as flag nation for the AWACS
mainly because "it had had no air force and therefore no existing national regulations covering military aircraft. '23 This
made Luxembourg an accommodating choice that would presumably afford the E-3A Component commander greater "latitude and flexibility," particularly with respect to the composition
of aircrews. 24 Hungary, in contrast, is a nation with an air force
and a regulatory history respecting military aviation that dates
back to the last days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (c.
1917) .25 Thus, at least in theory, the HAW commander is denied the greater operational autonomy no doubt associated with
18 Cf

PHILIPP WENDEL,

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

FOR INTERFERENCES

WITH

THE

164 n.542 (2007) (discussing the ship captain's jurisdictional authority); see also DoDD 4500.54E, supra
note 16, at 2; FOREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, C2.2.5.
19 Cf NICOLAS M. MATTIE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAw 293 (1981) (discussing factors that influence the status of the aircraft commander as a "delegate"
of the state of registration).
20 Frequently Asked Questions, NATO, http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/faq.
htm [hereinafter NATO E-3A COMPONENT FAQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
21 Id.
22 See id. NAEW&CF program participants include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nonvay, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
23 Id.
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

24

25

Id.
See Directorate for Air Transport,

NATIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,

old.nkh.gov.hu/en/aviation/content/view/4/25

http://

(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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a flag nation like Luxembourg, which, as the prospective flag
nation for the NATO AWACS, was a veritable blank canvas with
respect to the assertion of national competence over military
aviation.

The lion on the tail of the NATO E-3A (AWACS) aircraft signifies that they fly
under the flag of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
(Photo: http://www.e3a.nato.int).

Another potentially more legally significant distinction between the NATO AWACS and the SAC C-17s stems from the fact
that the AWACS are jointly operated under the auspices of
NATO-a collective defense organization established by treaty.
The AWACS thus not only provide airborne command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) support to Alliance objectives,27 but also participate in the
international legal personality of NATO . 2 1 Conversely, the SAC
C-17s, though "owned" by the NATO Airlift Management Or26 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
(entered into force on Aug. 24, 1949), available at http://AWw.nato.iint/cps/en/
natolive/official-texts 17120.htm.
27 See NATO E-3A COMPONENT FAQ supra note 20; see also Viachos-Dengler,
suipra note 3, at 31 (calling the NATO AWACS fleet "[a] characteristic example of
a comhination of acquisition pooling and pooled management").
281See ALEXANDER SAMUEL MLLER, INTERNATIONAkL ORGA\NIZATIONS AND THEIR
HOST STATES: ASPECITS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 81 n.32 (1995).
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ganization (NAMO),29 operate outside the Alliance's military
command structure. 3° Plus, neither the SAC nor its operational
unit, the HAW, has any legal personality under either international law or the domestic law of participant nations.3 ' Therefore, consistent with what amounts to a "time-share plan" in the
form of the partnership's Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU),32 each SAC participant is left to individually determine

how best to use its flight hours, whether in furtherance of national requirements or in support of NATO, EU, UN, or other
third-party interests. 3 Because of the vagueness of the international regime for determining the legal status of aircraft, which
will be discussed later, this ad hoc utilization arrangement
could, in practice, undermine the status of SAC aircraft qua state
aircraft and, in turn, cast doubt on the legal authority of the
aircraft commander.
Furthermore, the legal interests and concerns arising out of
the privileges and immunities of state aircraft are particularly
acute in the case of "air mobility aircraft"34 (like the C-17), as
compared to combat aircraft 35 (like the AWACS) .36 This is because combat aircraft generally "function as instrumentalities of
29 SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 7.1. Established by the North Atlantic Council,
NAMO is a NATO Procurement, Logistics or Services Organization (NPLSO) responsible for the "acquisition, management and logistic support, spare parts[,]
and other sustainment activity of [SAC] C-17 aircraft and other [SAC program
assets]." Id. § 4.1.2.
30 See id. §§ 3.5, 5.3, 12.1, 20.1.
31 Id. § 19.1.2.
32 KNIGHT & BOLKCOM, supra note 2, at 35.
33 SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 17.
34 SeeJoINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 13 (2010) (as amended through
Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter DoD DICTIONARY], available at http://wwv.dtic.mil/
doctrine/new.pubs/jpl 02.pdf ("air mobility" is "[t]he rapid movement of personnel, materiel and forces to and from or within a theater by air ....
[and]
includes both airlift and air refueling."); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-17: AIR MOBILITY OPERATIONS I-8 (2009) [hereinafter JOINT PuB. 3-17]
("Airlift forces conduct operations through the air to transport personnel and
materiel in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and to deliver
these personnel and materiel via airland or airdrop methods.") (emphasis
omitted).
35 "Combat Air Forces" are "[a]ir forces that are directly engaged in combat
operations. Examples include fighters; bombers; command and control; combat
search and rescue; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft."
U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTR. 10-420: COMBAT AIR FORCES AVIATION SCHEDULING 21 (2010) [hereinafter AFI 10-420].
36 See Christopher M. Petras, The Law of Air Mobility-The InternationalLegal
PrinciplesBehind the U.S. Mobility Air Forces'Mission,66 A.F. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (2010).
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armed conflict and, in this role, exercise the combat rights of a
belligerent (e.g., overflying territory of an opposing belligerent,
attacking military targets, etc.)."37 Air mobility aircraft, on the
other hand, "operate across the full spectrum of [military and
political] objectives."3 So, besides "providing wartime combat
support and aeromedical evacuation, mobility air forces aircraft
provide, inter alia, peacetime sustainment and aeromedical evacuation of U.S. forces worldwide, as well as support to civil authorities and humanitarian relief."39 Moreover, whereas combat
aircraft mainly operate within a given theater of operations and
are, therefore, generally more likely to take off and land at the
same base, air mobility aircraft are used to transport passengers
and cargo over intercontinental distances and, in so doing, "regularly utilize" far-flung "foreign military and/or civilian airports. '40 The far-reaching, truly global character of air mobility

aircraft operations, thus, not only makes air mobility aircraft "inimitably dependent upon the navigational rights and freedoms
of overflight enshrined in international law,"' 4' but arguably also

makes them more likely to be subjected to foreign jurisdictional
claims or other infringements upon state aircraft sovereignty as
compared to combat aircraft.

17 Id. at 5 (citing Hague Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy
in Time of War and Air Warfare, Feb. 17, 1923, arts. 13, 16, 22, availableat http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/275?OpenDocument, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DocUMENTS 317 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy]); see Richard H. Wyman,
The First Rules of Air Warfare, xxxv AIR UNVERSrrY REVIEW 94, 98-99 (Mar.-Apr.
1984) (discussing attempts at international regulation of aerial warfare during
the early 1900s), available at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/
aureview/1984/mar-apr/wyman.html.
38 Petras, supra note 36, at 5 (citing JOINT PUB. 3-17, supra note 34, at VI-1).
39 Id. at 5 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-6: AIR MOBILITY OPERATIONS 2, 29, 87 (2006) [hereinafter AFDD 2-6],
available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/docs/afdd/afdd2-6.pdf); see
also DoD Dictionary, supra note 34, at 5 (defining "aeromedical evacuation" as
"[t]he movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical
treatment facilities by air transportation").
40 Petras, supra note 36, at 5-6.
41 Id. at 74.

2012]

MULTINATIONAL AIRLIFT FLEET

The Boeing C-17 "Globernaster III" in flight
(Photo: http:/ /www.af.mil/shared/media/photokb/photos/30327-F-9528H-OO
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1.jpg)

The balance of this article will examine the legal implications
and potential operational impacts of having a military officer
from the armed forces of one nation pilot and serve as aircraft
commander over a foreign flagged state aircraft and, particularly, a mobility aircraft, as in the case of a multinational strategic airlift operation like the SAC. The starting point for this
assessment is an understanding of the special international legal
status of state aircraft. Thus, Part II of the article will look at the
definition of state aircraft and the associated rights and privileges of state aircraft under international law. With this underpinning, Part III will detail the corresponding legal authorities
and responsibilities of the military aircraft commander. Part IV
will then discuss how both the legal status and function of state
aircraft as sovereign instrumentalities levy special requirements
on the aircraft commander, such that the SAC C-17 commander's role as de facto representative of the aircraft's "territorial sovereign" could, at times, be inconsistent with his role and
responsibilities as an officer in the armed forces of his sending
state. Finally, Part V of the article will propose another potential
organizational structure for the SAC Consortium, which if
adopted could serve to eliminate these legal and operational
conflicts and their potential consequences for the participant
nation concerned, be it the flag nation for the aircraft, the send-
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ing state of the aircraft commander, or the benefactor of a particular mission.
II.

THE STATUS OF STATE (MILITARY) AIRCRAFT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention or Convention or Treaty) entered into force
on April 4, 1947 and today remains vital as the legal framework
for international civil aviation, boasting a remarkable 191 state
parties.42 Although the main focus of the Chicago Convention
is obviously civil aviation, one of the Treaty's most notable accomplishments is the recognition and codification of the panoply of substantive public international air law principles, to
include the longstanding legal distinction between civil and
state aircraft. 43 Specifically, Article 3(a) provides that the Chicago Convention "shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and
shall not be applicable to state aircraft[,]" and, though the
Treaty does not explicitly define the terms "civil aircraft" and
"state aircraft," Article 3(b) stipulates that "[a]ircraft used in
military, customs[,] and police services shall be deemed to be
state aircraft.

'44

Still, because the Chicago Convention does not

straightforwardly declare aircraft used in military, customs, and
police services to be state aircraft, there is considerable debate
as to whether this enumeration is exhaustive, such that state aircraft other than military, customs, and police aircraft are
deemed to be civil aircraft and therefore subject to the Treaty's
provisions; or merely informative, such that there can be state
aircraft other than those specified that are likewise exempted
from the Treaty's provisions.45 However, the predominant view
42 Foundation of the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization(ICA O), ICAO, http:/
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011). See
/www.icao.int/icao/en/hist/history02.htm
http://www.icao.int/cgi/statesDB4.pl?en for an official list of state parties to the
convention.
43 PAUL S. DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw 43, 47-48 (2008); see also
Petras, supra note 36, at 7-8.
Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61 Stat. at 1181.
45 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], SecretariatStudy on "Civil/State Aircraft",
at 5, ICAO Doc. LC/29-WP/2-1 (Mar. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Study on Civil/State
Aircraft] ("Currently, there are no clear generally accepted international rules,
whether conventional or customary, as to what constitute state aircraft and what
constitute civil aircraft in the field of air law."); compare MATTE, supra note 19, at
139 ("There is no definition of the term 'civil aircraft' and 'State aircraft' given in
the Convention. However, art. [3(b)] stipulates that 'aircraft used in military,
customs[,] and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft.' This para-
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is that types of state aircraft other than those specified in Article
3(b) are treated as "civil aircraft," though only in regard to
whether they fall within the scope of applicability of the Convention and not in any broader context. 6
Notably, as with state aircraft, there is, as well, no per se definition of military aircraft in international law." It has been proposed that the Paris Convention of 1919 solidified "the concept
of military aircraft as 'instrumentalities of nations performing
noncommercial sovereign functions"' as an international norm,4"
graph is to be regarded as exhaustive."), with MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ICAO 70 (2008).
[Article 3 (b)] is not a definition but only a rebuttable presumption
(presumptio iuris). Many other types of aircraft may be involved in
activities of the State iure imperii (in the State function), such as
coast guard, search and rescue, medical services, mapping or geological survey services, disaster relief, VIP and Government transport, etc.; consequently, the examples given in article 3(b) cannot
be taken as all-comprehensive.
Cf Civil-Military Interface Standing Committee, Definition of State Aircraft, THE EuROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION (Dec. 7, 2001), http://
("[Oinly aircraft
www.eurocontrol.int/mil/public/standard-page/stateac.html
used in military, customs[,] and police services shall qualify as State Aircraft.")
(emphasis added); ISABELLA H. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR
LAw 43-44 (2006) (identifying seven distinguishable categories of state aircraft);
see generally Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Military Aircraft and International
Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66J. AIR L. & COM. 885, 896-912 (2001) (analyzing Article 3
of the Chicago Convention as it regards "the concept and function of military
aircraft"); see also Petras, supra note 36, at 7-8.
46 Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45, at 13 ("This interpretation has no
bearing on matters such as sovereign immunities and privileges attaching to state
aircraft (as used in the broader sense) or other issues not dealt with in the Chicago Convention."); see also Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft
over the High Seas in the Global War on Terror,59 A.F. L. REv. 73, 106 (2007) ("The
main drawback for states of having their aircraft subject to the Chicago Convention is that foreign officials would have the right to board and search their aircraft on landing and departure, and could demand to see the aircraft's
certificates and other documents required by the [treaty]."); see also Petras, supra
note 36, at 7; cf.Chicago Convention, supranote 11, 61 Stat. at 1185 ("The appropriate authorities of each of the contracting States shall have the right, without
unreasonable delay, to search aircraft of the other contracting States on landing
or departure, and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by
this Convention.").
47 See Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45, at 6-8. For further discussion
of this issue and its significance for air mobility forces, see Petras, supra note 36,
at 16-21.
48 Petras, supra note 36, at 17 (quoting Bourbonniere & Haeck, supra note 45,
at 891 (emphasis added) and citing Convention Relating to the Regulation of
Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, art. 32, 11 L.N.T.S. 173, 195 [hereinafter Paris
Convention], reprinted in "Chicago" Acts and Related Protocols, XXX-1 ANNALS AiR &
SPACE L. 5 (2005)).

118

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

but this view is not universally shared. For example, in a 2001
legal memorandum, the DoD General Counsel assailed "the
commercial versus noncommercial distinction as 'too vague'
and 'jeopardizing] the sovereign immunity of military aircraft
conducting international operations.' ,,49 To this end, the defini-

tion of military aircraft endorsed by the DoD "parallels [that of]
'warships' in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea."'
Based in international law, this emergent definition "classifies as
military aircraft 'all aircraft operated by commissioned units of
the armed forces of a nation bearing the military markings of
that nation, commanded by a member of the military forces,
and manned by a crew subject to regular armed forces discipline."' 5 1 Under this approach, "military aircraft operating
under the direction of the DoD are 'Chicago-type' state aircraft-with the attached sovereign immunity and other rights
and privileges52 -regardless of' the purpose of a given flight "or
whether the military service receives reimbursement" for it.5"
Yet the theoretical limitations of both of these definitions are
readily apparent when applied to multinational alliance or consortium aircraft like the NATO AWACS and the SAC C-17s. For
example, under the former standard, both units' aircraft would
appear to satisfy the criteria for military aircraft to the extent
49 Id. (quoting Memorandum from Williams J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the
Dep't of Def., to Richard B. Cheney, President of the Senate, andJ. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives 7 (Jul. 11, 2001), available at http:/
/www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/Julyl2-Second.pdf
[hereinafter DOD/GC
Memo]).
5o Id. (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 29, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]).
51 Id. (quoting DOD/GC Memo, supra note 49, at 8 and citing NAVAL WARFARE
PUB. 1-14M, supra note 16,
2.4.1; USAF Oes LAW HANDBOOK, supranote 16, at 6;
LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 174 (2008));
MILDE, supra note 45, at 72; see also Williams, supra note 46, at 111 (noting that
this same definition appears in the U.K. Ministry of Defence's Manual of the Law
of Armed Conflict (2004) and in the San Remo Manualon InternationalLaw Applicable
to Armed Conflicts at Sea, published by the International Institute of Humanitarian
Law in 1994, which he calls "the most contemporary and comprehensive restatement of the law of warfare at sea").
52 Petras, supra note 36, at 18 (citing Bourbonniere & Haeck, supra note 45, at
901-03).
53 Id. (citing DOD/GC Memo, supra note 49). ComparePETER P.C. HAANAPPEL,
THE LAw AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE: A

COMPARATIVE APPROACH

44 (2003) (" [F]ighter planes: even if they are used for training or demonstration
services (air shows), they are military aircraft."), with MILDE, supra note 45, at 71
(giving an example that "an unarmed fighter plane F-18 piloted by a military
officer cleared under a civil flight plan for a flight to another country's civil airport to deliver a rare serum for a critically ill person ... could claim civil status").
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that they function as state aircraft of their particular flag nations
(Luxembourg and Hungary) and their primary missions-i.e.,
airborne command and control and transport of troops and
their supplies, respectively-are characteristically military. On
the other hand, because SAC participants may utilize their flying
hours in support of non-participants, 54 the status of a SAC aircraft could be called into question if, for instance, a third party
on behalf of whom a particular HAW mission was flown were to
reimburse a participant nation for use of all or part of its allocated share of flying hours.5 5 Likewise, under the latter definition, the status of both the NATO AWACS and the SAC C-1 7s as
military aircraft is technically questionable insofar as neither
may actually be operated by the armed forces of the nation
whose military markings are displayed on the aircraft.
Faced with this sort of uncertainty, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Secretariat has long called for the
ICAO Council56 to consider resolving the state versus civil aircraft dilemma by adopting an interpretation of Article 3 (b) similar to the 1952 "Definition of Scheduled International Air
Service. 57 As with the term "state aircraft," the Chicago Convention assigns certain overflight rights to "scheduled air services" and "nonscheduled flight,

'58

respectively, but does not

explicitly define either term; "rather, 'nonscheduled flight' is
only negatively described as not being scheduled air transportaSAC MOU, supra note 11, § 17.3.
See Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45, at 11 ("Doubts regarding the
status of aircraft under Article [3(b)] of the convention most often arise [when]
* . .[a]ircraft [that] would otherwise be considered state aircraft (perhaps even
with a military crew) [are] . . .used to carry passengers, mail[,] and cargo for
remuneration or hire."); see also DOD/GC Memo, supra note 49, at 7-8.
56 "The Council is the 36-member governing body of ICAO, chosen by the
representatives of all member nations that make up the ICAO Assembly." Petras,
supra note 36, at n.62 (citing ICAO, How IT WoRKS, available at http://
www.icao.int/icao/en/howworks.htm).
57 Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45, at 16; see also ICAO, Definition of
Scheduled InternationalAir Service, ICAO Doc. 7278-C/841 (1952) (adopted pursuant to ICAO Assembly Resolution A2-18); Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61
Stat. 1181-82 (defining traffic rights for "scheduled international air service" and
"aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air service" (i.e., "nonscheduled
flight")); MATrE, supra note 19, at 151 n.98, 162 (noting that the Council defined
"scheduled international air service" by spelling out its constituent elements, so
that if any one element were not met, the service would be classified as "nonscheduled"). For further discussion of the adoption of the 1952 "Definition of
Scheduled International Air Service," see Petras, supra note 36, at 14-15.
58 Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61 Stat. at 1181-82.
54
55
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tion, which again is also undefined. '59 So, in 1952, the ICAO
Council proposed a definition that reduced "scheduled services"
to its constituent elements and "'thereby delimit[ed] nonscheduled services in a negative manner'-in other words, if any one
element of 'scheduled international air service' [were] not met,
the service [would be] classified as 'nonscheduled." 6 By comparison, the Secretariat's proposal for determining whether an
aircraft is a "Chicago-type" state aircraft-i.e., an aircraft "used"
in military, customs, or police services-employs a "totality of
the circumstances" approach, whereby a variety of factors would
be taken into account and the weight given to any one factor or
set of factors would vary based on the facts surrounding a particular flight.6 Factors to be considered would include:
(1) ownership of the aircraft;
(2) aircraft registration and markings;
(3) the operator of the aircraft;
(4) the nature of the operation (i.e., degree of military, custom, or police service control);
(5) make-up of the aircrew;
(6) secrecy or open nature of the flight;
(7) the type of passengers and/or cargo on board;
(8) the area of operations;
(9) whether there are customs clearances for the flight; and/or
(10) whether the aircraft is carrying documents required by the
Chicago Convention and its Annexes.62
Such an approach may represent an improvement over the
currently prevailing ambiguity, but inasmuch as it seemingly still
allows an aircraft that is for all intents and purposes "military"e.g., in terms of its design, operator, markings, crew make-up,
etc.-to be classified as "civil" based on the particulars of a given
flight, it is unlikely to engender consensus among state parties
59 Petras, supra note 36, at 14 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61
Stat. at 1181 (defining "nonscheduled flight" as "aircraft not engaged in scheduled air services"); cf Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61 Stat. at 1206 (noting
that Article 92 defines "air services" as "any scheduled air service performed by
aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail[,] and cargo," and "international air services" as "an air service [that] passes through the airspace over the
territory of more than one State"); MA=tE, supra note 19, at 148-66 (discussing
Article 5 of the Chicago Convention and the distinction between scheduled and
nonscheduled services)).
60 Id. (quoting MATTE, supra note 19, at 151 n.98, 162).
But see MILDE, supra
note 45, at 101 (noting that "[t]his definition is just an interpretation ... and
need not be taken as rigid or definitive").
61 See Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45, at 14.
62 Id.
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regarding how state/military aircraft should be defined in international law. 63 Still, the uncertainty surrounding the legal definitions of state and military aircraft notwithstanding, the
classification of aircraft as "civil" or "state" remains significant,
not only because it controls the applicability of the Chicago
Convention and the ICAO regulatory regime embodied in the
Treaty's Annexes, 64 but also in terms of its impact on overflight
rights.

65

Article 5 of the Chicago Convention grants civil aircraft flying
"'non-scheduled flights' (e.g., charter flights) ... the first two of
the so-called 'five freedoms' of the air: (1) the freedom to fly
into or across the territory of another state (transit), and (2) the
freedom to make stops for non-traffic purposes, such as refueling or maintenance (technical stops). ' 66 "A 'side' agreement"
63 See MILDE, supra note 45, at 72; cf DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 45, at 41
(advocating for adoption of the definition of military aircraft proposed by de
Vlugt whereby "military aircraft are aircraft forming part of, or-by virtue of registration in a military aviation register-destined to form part of, the armed
forces").
64 The Chicago Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)-a U.N. Specialized Agency responsible for ensuring "safe, regular, efficient[,] and economical air transport." Chicago Convention, supra note
11, 61 Stat. at 1193, 1197. Through the "ICAO's quasi-legislative authority," it has
adopted eighteen annexes to the treaty, "each of which contains [Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs)] on a specific substantive area." Petras, supra
note 36, at 60 (citing DEMPSEY, supra note 43, at 51-53 (listing the Chicago Convention Annexes)). State aircraft are not subject to ICAO rules, but pursuant to
Article 3(d) of the treaty must at all times operate with due regard for the safety
of navigation. See Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61 Stat. at 1181 ("The
contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft,
that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."); see
also RESTATEMENT 31, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 16, § 514 cmt. d.
65 "Paradoxically, although the Chicago Convention purports not to be applicable to State aircraft, in fact, several provisions specifically apply to State aircraft." DEMPSEY, supra note 43, at 48; see also Petras, supra note 36, at 7-8.
66 Petras, supra note 36, at 11 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61
Stat. at 1181).
The "Five Freedoms of the Air" were spelled out in the International Air Transport Agreement ... as follows:
(1) The privilege to fly across territory without landing; (2) The
privilege to land for non-traffic purposes; (3) The privilege to put
down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of the
State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; (4) The privilege to
take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of the
State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; (5) The privilege to
take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of an),
other contracting State and the privilege to put down passengers,
mail and cargo coming from any such territory.
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[77

to the Treaty, known as the International Air Services Transit
Agreement (Two Freedoms Agreement), grants these "same baa7
sic traffic rights" to civil aircraft on scheduled flights as well.
Otherwise, air-traffic rights for civil aircraft are typically exchanged between states on a reciprocal basis in accordance with
Article 6 of the Convention through bilateral treaties known as
"air transport" or "air services" agreements.68
Conversely, Article 3(c) of the Convention forbids state aircraft (including military aircraft) from "overflying or landing in"
the territory of another state unless pursuant to, and in conformance with, the terms of a "special authorization from the
over-flown [s]tate (e.g., [a] diplomatic clearance)." 9 Requests
for overflight permission for state aircraft are generally considId. at n.46 (citing International Air Transport Agreement art. 1, § 1, Dec. 7, 1944,
59 Stat. 1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387 [hereinafter Transport Agreement] and DEMPSEY,
supra note 43, at 18-31 (discussing the "five freedoms" of the air that the U.S.
delegation advanced at the 1944 Chicago Conference, as well as other freedoms
of the air that have since been identified)); see also id. at 10-14 (discussing the
Chicago Convention's "three-tiered regime" for the exchange of over-flight (or
air traffic) rights).
67 Id. at 12 (citing DEMPSEY, supra note 43, at 29). "Under Article 1, Section 1,
of the Transit Agreement '[e]ach contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: (1) The privilege to fly across its territory without landing; (2)
The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes."' Id. at n.52 (quoting International Air Services Transit Agreement art. 1, § 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Star. 1693, 84
U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Transit Agreement]). "The Transport Agreement,...
which was also concluded at the Chicago Convention, provided for a multilateral
exchange of all five freedoms of the air for international air services. As Professor Dempsey notes, however, 'in the ensuing half century, fewer than a dozen
nations ratified this agreement, and even the United States-its principal proponent-withdrew after ratification."' Id. (quoting DEMPSEY, supra note 43, at 29).
68 See id. at 13-14; see also MILDE, supra note 45, at 107-13 (discussing bilateral
air services agreements).
69 Petras, supra note 36, at 10-11 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note 11,
61 Stat. at 1181); see also, e.g.,
FoREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra note 16,
DL.1.3 (2009) (defining "aircraft diplomatic clearance"):
Permission by a foreign government for a United States aircraft to
overfly or land in its territory. An aircraft diplomatic clearance permits the movement into or through the territory of a foreign country of military aircraft, cargo, equipment, and aircrew members
performing aircrew duties only, including the related activities necessarily involved in such entry or transit, subject to whatever restrictions the clearance specifies. Acceptance of a flight plan and the
issuance of a flight clearance by a foreign air traffic control (ATC)
unit does not constitute official approval to enter the airspace of
any country that requires either prior permission or aircraft diplomatic clearance.
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ered on a case-by-case basis,7" "and usually require[e] 'a statement of the flight's purpose, route and final destination, and
the aircraft used." 7 State aircraft that fail to conform or act in
accordance with the terms of the special permission granted by
the over-flown state "may ...be denied access to or directed to

immediately leave

the

[sitate's

territory and/or national

airspace."72

In addition, any unauthorized intrusion into national airspace
by a foreign aircraft is a violation of both customary sovereignty
and the Chicago Convention.73 Historically, the affected state
would "have the legal right to respond" to such incursions "by
intercepting the offending aircraft and turning it away; forcing
it to land at a designated airfield; impounding the aircraft if it
lands; or even shooting it down."74 However, in the aftermath of

"the 1983 downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by Soviet
fighter aircraft, the ICAO Assembly 75 amended the Chicago
Convention, adding Article 3 bis,"' 76 which codified the customCf Petras, supra note 36, at 70 n.410 (citing FOREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL,
supra note 16, DL1.6 (defining "blanket clearance" as a "prearranged clearance
for special categories of flights or personnel travel, usually granted on a periodic
basis for a specified purpose and/or period of time")).
71 "However, because [s]tates enjoy complete and exclusive sovereignty over
their airspace, overflight permission may, for example, be further conditioned
upon compliance with aircraft 'disinsection' and quarantine requirements, providing passenger lists or cargo information, or other stipulations." Petras, supra
note 36, at 70 (citing Secretary General'sReport under Article 52 ECHR on the Question
of Secret Detention and Transport of Detainees Suspected of TerroristActs, Notably by or at
the Instigation of Foreign Agencies, Council of Europe,
45, Doc. SG/Inf(2006)6
(2006) ("States applying for overflight permissions are not systematically requested to provide passenger lists or information about cargo, even though this
would be possible."); AUSTL. QUARANTINE & INSPECTION SERV. (AQIS), AQIS AR_
RANGEMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT INVOKING SOVEREIGN IMMUNIIY (2008) (discussing "disinsection" requirements, or treatment to destroy insects), available at http://
daff.gov.au/aqis/avm/aircraft/sovereign-immunity).
72 Petras, supra note 36, at 70-71 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note 11,
61 Stat. at 1181; NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra note 16, 2.4.2).
73 MATTE, supra note 19, at 175.
74 Petras, supra note 36, at 21 (citing BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL
LAw: A DICTIONARY 203 (2005) (discussing states' responses to airspace incursions
by foreign aircraft); Bourbonniere & Haeck, supra note 45, at 946; CATHAL J.
NOLAN, 2 GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: F-L 814
(2002)).
75 Id. "The Assembly, composed of representatives from all Contracting States,
is the sovereign body of ICAO. It meets every three years, reviewing in detail the
work of the Organization and setting policy for the coming years. It also votes a
triennial budget." Id. at n.108 (quoting ICAO, How IT WORKS, supra note 56).
76 Id. at 21-22. "Under Article 94(b) of the Convention, the amendment came
into force on 1 October 1998 in respect of those States [that] have ratified it." Id.
70
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ary international law principle that states "'must refrain from
resorting to weapons against civil aircraft in flight' or, in the case
of interception, endangering the safety of the aircraft and those
on board."77 Nevertheless, because trespassing military aircraft
present an obvious security threat "to the territorial sovereign,
international legal standards for Is] tate responses to aerial intrusions" differentiate between civil and military aircraft by "imposing a much lower threshold for the use of force without warning
against military aircraft that intrude into the territory of another
[s] tate."78
Perhaps even more important for present purposes, dating
back to the Paris Convention of 1919, aircraft classified as military aircraft have been regarded as sovereign instrumentalities
with "the same status under international law as warships."79 In
other words, military aircraft enjoy customary immunity "'from
the jurisdiction of other [s] tates, even when they are in the territory of those other [s] tates.' "80

In practice, this means that the flag nation for the aircraft "exercises exclusive control over all" passengers, crew members,
and activities on board, and both the aircraft and its crew are
not only "immune from arrest or seizure" by the foreign state,
at n.109 (quoting Maria Buzdugan, "Chicago" Acts and Related Protocols, XXX-1
& SPACE LAw 20 n.1 (2005)).
77 Id. at 22 (quoting Buzdugan, supra note 76, at 20 n.1 (emphasis added) and
citing BOCZEK, supra note 78, at 204; Marco Gestri, The Chicago Convention and
Civilian Aircraft in Time of War, in THE LAW Or AIR WARFARE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 129, 143-49 (Natalino Ronzitti & Gabriella Venturini eds., 2006) (discussing
status of civilian aircraft in time of armed conflict)).
78 Id. at 22 (citing John T. Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft
in Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REV. 255, 291-94 (1985); Bourbonniere & Haeck,
supra note 45, at 946; BOCZEK, supra note 74, at 204).
79 Id. at 69 (citing Paris Convention, supra note 48, 11 L.N.T.S. at 195); see also
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Il Petras, supra note 36, at 68-69 (quoting Williams, supra note 46, at 104 (em-

ANNALS OF AIR

phasis added));J.

ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES

TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS

3D,

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,

163, 466-67 (2d ed. 1996) (citing

RESTATEMENT

supra note 16) (traditionally, the sovereign immu-

nity of military aircraft imparts customary immunity from "the exercise of enforcementjurisdiction"-i.e., "immunity from arrest, attachment, or execution in
the territory of any foreign State"); see also FOREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra
note 16, C2.1.5; NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra note 16, 2.4.2; Annotated
Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
73 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES 110, 114-15 (A.R. Thomas
&James C. Duncan eds., 1999); cf Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 144
(1812) (holding that a public vessel of war of a sovereign is exempt from the
jurisdiction of a foreign country); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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but also "exempt from [foreign] taxes and regulation."'" Therefore, absent an "agreement between the [s]tates concerned to
the contrary, military aircraft are exempt from [air navigation,
overflight, or similar] fees for transit through" the national airspace of another state or through "FIRs in international airspace, as well as landing, parking, and other use fees assessed at
government airports" and military installations.8" Moreover, the
exclusivity of the flag nation's jurisdiction further means that
foreign officials may neither board the "aircraft without the aircraft commander's consent,"83 nor require the aircraft commander "to consent to an onboard search or inspection,
including customs, safety, and agricultural inspections."84
Though the Chicago Convention does not expressly recognize the sovereign immunity of military aircraft, "sovereign immunity is not typically set forth in positive rules of international
law, but instead is oftentimes expressed by exempting public vessels from the terms of a particular treaty.

'85

Indeed, the Chi-

cago Convention is a true case in point. Under Article 3 of the
Treaty, "state aircraft are excluded from the legal framework for
civil aviation, whereby civil aircraft are not only [made] subject
to the jurisdiction or control of foreign air traffic control authorities when operating in international airspace, but also subject to search and inspection while within" the territory of a
foreign state.86 Thus, as renowned American jurist, scholar, and
air law pioneer, John Cobb Cooper, noted:
It is felt that the rule stated in the Paris Convention that aircraft
engaged in military services should, in the absence of stipulation
to the contrary, be given the privileges of foreign warships when
in national port is sound and may be considered as still part of
NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra note
2.2.2; DoDD 4500.54E, supra note 16, at 2).
82 Id. (citing DoDD 4500.54E, supra note 16, at 2; MILDE, supra note 45, at 72).
83 Id. at 69 (citing NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra note 16,
2.4.2); see also
GEORGE GALDORISI & KEVIN R. VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW DIREcTIONS FOR U.S. OCEANS POLICY 101 (1997).
84 Petras, supra note 36, at 69-70 (citing NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra
note 16,
2.2.2, 2.4.2; DoDD 4500.54E, supra note 16, at 2).
85 Petras, supranote 36, at 69 (citing ROACH & SMITH, supranote 80, at 466-67;
MILDE, supra note 45, at 61, 65-66); see also DIEDERIs-VERSCHOOR, supra note 45,
at 43-44 (listing international agreements containing references to state
aircraft).
86 Petras, supra note 36, at 69 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note 11, 61
Stat. at 1183, 1185).
81

16,

Petras, supra note 36, at 70 (citing
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international air law even though not restated in the Chicago
Convention.8 7
The ICAO Secretariat has cautioned that the lack of clear
rules on what constitutes a state aircraft could lead to an aircraft,
which is "operating on the assumption that it is a civil aircraft
entitled to exercise" overflight and technical stop privileges
under Article 5 of the Chicago Convention, being deemed an
unauthorized state aircraft by the overflown state, thereby needlessly exposing the aircraft and its unsuspecting crew (and, potentially, passengers as well) to the danger of possible
interception or even the use of force.8 8 But aside from the resulting uncertainty over the applicability of certain air law instruments, the significance of a state aircraft being classified as a
civil aircraft (mistakenly or otherwise) is generally perceived as
theoretical.8" However, for the state/military aircraft commander, the matter of the legal status of the aircraft as civil or
state goes beyond the issue of whether the aircraft and/or its
operation is subject to international legal regulations promoting
"the safety, regularity[,] and economy of air navigation."9 As
one commentator has aptly noted, "military aircraft represent[ ]
the sovereignty and independence of [the flag nation] more
clearly than any other kind of aircraft."9 ' Consequently, "universally accepted rules of international law" extend to military aircraft the same sovereign immunity enjoyed by warships, such
that, it is submitted, the authority of the military aircraft commander mirrors the customary authority of the commander of a
warship. 2 The legal classification of an aircraft as "military" is
87 Williams, supra note 46, at 105 (quoting John Cobb Cooper, A Study on the
Legal Status of Aircraft, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw 205, 243 (Ivan A. Vlasic
ed., 1968)); see also Petras, supra note 36, at 69.
88 Petras, supra note 36, at 19 (citing Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45,
at 8); see also Buzdugan, supra note 76.
89 See Study on Civil/State Aircraft, supra note 45, at 9-11; see also MILDE, supra
note 45, at 72.
90 MILDE, supra note 45, at 73.
91 Nicholas Grief, Public InternationalLaw in the Airspace of the High Seas 86 in
UTRECHT STUDIES IN AIR AND SPACE LAW (G.C.M. Reijnen et al. eds. 1994).
92 See A.E. Gotlieb, CanadianPractice in InternationalLaw During 1964 as Reflected
in Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs, 3 CAN. YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 315, 316 (C.B. Bourne ed., 1965) (quoting a letter from the
Secretary of State for External Affairs); see also ROACH & SMITH, supra note 80, at
466-71 (discussing the sovereign immunity of warships and military aircraft);
GRIEF, supra note 91, at 86 (noting that the legal status of military aircraft is "best
defined with reference to that of warships"); cf SIGMAR STADLMEIER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AVIATION: FROM FOREIGN POLICY TO TRADE IN SERVICES 1-2
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thus a necessary and fundamental prerequisite to this grant of
authority, which is, in turn, a key enabling element of global air
mobility aircraft operations.
III.

MILITARY AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AUTHORITY

Once again, the classification of military aircraft as sovereign
instrumentalities that are immune from the jurisdiction of other
states derives from the status ascribed warships under customary
international law. 3 Ergo, like warships, military aircraft are, in a
legal sense, a part of the territory of the nation whose flag they
fly.94 Flag-nation jurisdiction within the confines of the aircraft
fuselage is therefore "territorial" in nature, meaning the aircraft
and all onboard activities are the exclusive province of the flag
nation and any offenses or other acts committed on board are
95
thus considered to have been committed within its territory.
What's more, corresponding to the powers vested in the commander of a warship by virtue of customary admiralty jurisdiction, the jurisdictional authority of the flag nation aboard
military aircraft is embodied in the aircraft commander.96
In practical terms, jurisdictional authority imparts to the military aircraft commander-or "pilot-in-command" (PIC), as he
(Marietta Benk6 & Willem de Graaf eds., 1998) (discussing the roots of air law
and the analogy between the legal regimes governing navigation at sea and in the
air); SAMI SHUBBER, JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES ON BOARD AIRCRAF 233-34
(1973) (noting the resemblance between the rights and duties of the aircraft
commander and those of the master of a ship under English law); DIEDERIKSVERSCHOOR, supra note 45, at 33-36 (contrasting the position of an aircraft commander with that of a ship's captain). Compare, e.g.,
NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M,
supra note 16, 2.2.2 ("U.S. Navy policy requires warships to assert the rights of
sovereign immunity."), with FOREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra note 16,
C2.1.5.1 ("[Lit is U.S. policy to assert that [U.S. military aircraft] are entitled to
the same privileges and immunities customarily accorded warships.").
93 See supra notes 79-80, 92 and accompanying text.
94 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
95 See NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra note 16,
3.11.1.3 (discussing the
"Nationality Principle" as a basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction); see also
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 234 ("The principle of territoriality has been invoked
also to support regulation by the flag state of activities on board a vessel or aircraft."); SHUBBER, supra note 92, at 52 n.16 ("'[A]n aircraft like a ship may, for
the purpose of jurisdiction, be regarded as being in the same position as territory."' (quoting R.Y. Jennings, Regina v. Martin and Others, 2 W.L.R. 975 (1956)Jurisdiction-CriminalLaw-Offenses on State British Aircraft Abroad, 5 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 604, 605 (1956))); cf.DIGEST OF INT'L LAW, supra note 17, at 930, 933 (asserting that an offense committed on board a warship is considered to be committed
within the jurisdiction of the nation to whom the ship belongs).
96 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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may be calledOV-the power to speak in the name of the flag
nation for purposes related to operation of the aircraft, to include the power to assert sovereign privileges or immunities in
the face of encroachment or excessive claims of sovereignty by
foreign states.9" Alternatively, the aircraft commander may also
validly consent to a boarding of the aircraft by foreign officials
and thereby render it lawful under international law.99 Furthermore, the status of military aircraft as equivalent to "moving territory" means that the aircraft commander may exercise
"executive jurisdiction" over any offenses and acts committed on
board in accordance with flag-nation law, regardless of where
the aircraft is when the offense is committed. 00
97 "Pilot-in-command" is defined as "[t] he pilot designated by the operator...
as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight." ICAO,
Personnel Licensing, Annex 1 to the Convention on Int'l Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc.
ICAO/ANX/1 (10th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Chicago Convention, Annex 1]. The
current practice of using the expression "pilot-in-command" (rather than "aircraft commander") in the ICAO Annexes reinforces the "view that the person in
command of the flight should, indeed be a pilot." Aart A. van Wijk, The Legal
Status of the Aircraft Commander-Ups and Downs of a ControversialPersonality in InternationalLaw, in ESSAYS IN AIR LAw 311, 343 n.70 (Arnold Kean ed., 1982); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-202, VOLUME 3, GENERAL
FLIGHT RULES 6 (2006) [hereinafter AFI 11-202V3] ("The Pilot in Command
(PIC) is responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of the
aircraft.").
98 Cf WENDEL, supra note 18, at 167-68 (discussing the flag state's delegation
of jurisdictional authority to the ship captain); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text. By regulation, U.S. Air Force aircraft commanders are vested with
authority necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. See Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2 Mission Design Series (MDS) Specific, Volume 3 instructions containing specific operational guidance unique to individual aircraft and crew
positions (e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-2C-9,
VOLUME 3, C-9 OPERATIONS PROCEDURES 15-16 (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR
FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 1 1-2KC-135, VOLUME 3, C/KC 135-OPERATIONS
PROCEDURES 17 (2008); U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 112C-17, VOLUME 3, C-17 OPERATIONS PROCEDURES 18 (2005)); see also FOREIGN
CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra note 16,
C2.1.1.3, .2.1.3, .2.7.4 (detailing procedures for protest of inappropriate aviation-related charges and for responding to
challenges to DoD aircraft operating in international airspace or transiting international straits or archipelagic sea lanes).
99 Cf.WENDEL, supra note 18, at 167-68.
100"[Executive jurisdiction] refers to the activities of authorities when exercising their powers to enforce and ensure observance of the law ...." COUNCIL OF
EUR. COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, ExtraterritorialCriminalJurisdiction, at 7, Doc.
COE.M.1.3/90 EX (1990). See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 44-45 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the
three types ofjurisdiction: legislative, adjudicative, and executive); cf DIGEST OF
INT'L LAW, supra note 17, at 930 (discussing jurisdiction aboard warships); Wil-
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At the same time, the jurisdictional authority of a military aircraft commander is limited in certain respects. First, it is temporary inasmuch as it is generally in force only for the duration of
a given flight or mission. 0 1 In addition, the aircraft commander's authority is normally subsidiary to that of organs that
officially represent the flag nation in international relations"' e.g., "the head of State, the government and its head, and the
minister of foreign affairs." 10 3 So, for example, although the
ability to effect a "protest" of a foreign power's infringement on
aircraft sovereignty 0 4 may reasonably be inferred as being
within the scope of the military aircraft commander's jurisdictional authority, 1 5 the aircraft commander would not be considered competent to give "recognition" (in an international legal
context) to what would otherwise be regarded by the governliams, supra note 46, at 104; BoczFK, supra note 74, at 321; SHUBBER, supra note
92, at 48-61.
101 Cf WENDEL, supra note 18, at 169 (noting that "[t] he jurisdiction delegated
by the flag State to the captain is temporary only"); see also DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR,
supra note 45, at 33-34; see, e.g., AF1 11-202V3, supra note 97, at 23 (providing that
the aircraft commander (or "pilot in command") is designated via the flight authorization for all flights of U.S. Air Force aircraft); ICAO, Rules of the Air, Annex 2
to the Convention on Int'l Civil Aviation, 2.4, ICAO Doc. ICAO/ANX/2 (10th ed.
2005) [hereinafter Chicago Convention, Annex 2] ("The pilot-in-command of an
aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while in command.") (emphasis added).
102 Cf WENDEL, supra note 18, at 169 ("The jurisdiction delegated by the flag
state to the captain is... definitely subsidiary to the powers of official authorities
of the flag State."); see, e.g.,
DoDD 4500.54E, supra note 16, at 2 ("DoD aircraft
commanders shall not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign government authorities over U.S. military aircraft, except at the direction of the appropriate DoD Component headquarters."); FoREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra
note 16, DL1.12 ("DoD aircraft, and personnel, cargo[,] and equipment that
remain on board DoD aircraft are exempt from search or inspection by foreign
authorities except by direction of the appropriate DoD Component headquarters
or the U.S. Embassy in the foreign country."); NAVAL WARFARE PUB. 1-14M, supra
note 16, 3.3.1.2 ("Commanders of U.S. warships, military aircraft, and military
installations in territories under foreign jurisdiction . . . are not authorized to
receive on board foreign nationals seeking asylum. Such persons should be referred to the American Embassy or nearest U.S. consulate.").
103 Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
Unilateral Acts of States, in INTERNATIONAL LAw:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 221, 230 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
104 Id. at 227 ("The protest is an act whereby the State expresses its opposition
to a situation, a claim or, generally, a state of things and the ensuing legal consequences. As a result, what is protested against is now brought in question in the
relations between the States concerned.").
105 See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Skubiszewski, supra note
103, at 230 (noting that a valid unilateral act may be done only by one authorized
to speak on behalf of the state in the particular field or matter).
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ment of the flag nation as an invalid or excessive claim of sovereignty by a foreign state,1 a or to "waive" sovereign immunity on
behalf of the flag nation, 10 7 unless expressly authorized to do
SO.

10 8

Yet, it should be noted that unlike waiver, which must be clear
and specific in content and cannot be presumed or inferred
from a failure to act, 0 9 recognition can, in certain circumstances, be implied from acquiescence or silence or, in other
words, a failure to protest.110 Therefore, in cases where a military
aircraft commander is authorized or would normally be expected to protest the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over
his aircraft by a foreign state, failure to do so may be deemed
tantamount to flag-nation recognition of the legitimacy of the
underlying legal basis for the foreign state's actions. 1 ' In the
short term, this would likely hamper flag-nation enforcement of
the sovereign immunity of its military aircraft, particularly vis-!106

Some examples of situations calling for recognition include:

[T]he birth of States, non-constitutional change of governments,
the status of insurgents, position of nations and peoples pursuing
their right to self-determination, territorial change and revision of
frontiers if not brought about by regular treaties, regimes of parts
of territory if modified or uncertain, and rights and claims if in
dispute or doubt.
Skubiszewski, supra note 103, at 227; see also PETER MALANCZUK, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 154-55 (7TH ED. 1997).
107 "Waiver ... is an act whereby the State gives up its claim, right, competence,
or power, which consequently cease to exist." Skubiszewski, supra note 103, at

229; see also VLADIMIR-DURo

DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

272 (1997)

(defining waiver as an act "by which [a State] renounces some of its subjective
rights").
108 See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
109

See DEGAN, supra note 107, at 272-73;

BOCZEK,

supra note 74, at 35; Skubis-

zewski, supra note 103, at 229. But see BoCZEK, supra note 74, at 35 (waiver may be
"tacit"); Skubiszewski, supra note 103, at 229 (noting that in the case of Certain
Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.CJ. 9, digested in 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 777
(1957), the Court's holding that waiver "must be declared expressly" was "too
rigid" and that implicit waiver cannot be excluded "provided it is unequivocal").
110 See Skubiszewski, supra note 103, at 228 ("[N]o general rule can be stated
on the absence of protest, in other words on the effect of silence and failure to
react. The essential question is whether the situation calls for a reaction if some
legal consequences are to be avoided."); see also MALANCZUK, supra note 106, at
154 ("[R]ecognition may take the form of an express statement, or may be inferred from acquiescence ....
[but] failure to protest a purely verbal assertion
...does not constitute acquiescence.").
II1 Skubiszewski, supra note 103, at 227-28, 230; see also MALANCZUK, supra note
106, at 154.

2012]

MULTINATIONAL AIRLIFT FLEET

vis the foreign-state violator in question.' 12 But over the long
term, an accumulation of such failures could serve to erode the
sovereign interests of the flag nation to the point that the unlawful claim or exercise of enforcement jurisdiction by the foreign
state would become legally valid through a change in customary
international law." 3
Beyond the jurisdictional authority that flows from the sovereign immunity of military aircraft, however, the authority of military aircraft commanders falls mainly outside the ambit of
international law. This is not to say that the subject has been
ignored; to the contrary, the importance of the position has
been recognized since the very dawn of aviation.114 In fact,
modern air law was arguably born amidst international declarations about the legal status of "military aeronauts" (balloon pilots) in the latter half of the 19th century.' 15 The 1923 Draft
Hague Rules of Air Warfare, which, though never ratified, won
general approval from most of the world's jurists at the time,116
likewise attempted to regulate the position." 7 And, more recently, the ICAO Assembly has established a practice of continually adopting a Resolution (without exception unanimously)
recognizing that "to the extent practicable" state aircraft should
be operated in compliance with Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention,"" which conspicuously endows the "pilot-in-com112 Skubiszewski, supra note 103, at 227 ("[T]he recognizing State cannot contest what it has recognized."); see also MALANCZUK, supra note 106:
It is sometimes said that recognition or acquiescence gives rise to
an estoppel ... [, which] has the effect of making it impossible for a
party to contradict its previous acts, behavior or statements, as in
English law; in other cases it is merely evidential (that is, its effect is
simply to make it difficult for a party to contradict its previous
conduct).
(citations omitted).
113 DEGAN, supra note 107, at 273.
114 SHUBBER, supra note 92, at 53.
115 See van Wijk, supra note 97, at 311-14; see also MATTE, supra note 19, at 282;
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 45, at 33.
116 See Richard H. Wyman, The First Rules of Air Warfare, 35 AIR U. REv. 94
(1984),
available at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/
1984/mar-apr/wyman.html.
117 See Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy, supra note 37,
art. 14.
118 MILDE, supra note 45, at 68; see ICAO, Consolidated Statement of Continuing
ICAO Policies and Associated Practices Related Specifically to Air Navigation, Assemb.
Res. A36-13, app. 0, compiled in Assembly Resolutions in Force, at 11-18, ICAO Doc.
9902 (Sep. 27, 2007), available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/9902/9902_
en.pdf.
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mand"" with "final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft
while in command.' '

20

Nevertheless, once military aircraft were

enshrined in the Paris Convention as sovereign instrumentalities
with the same privileges and immunities as warships, 121 military
aircraft commander authority was
largely subsumed within the
22
sphere of national sovereignty
Still, noteworthy is the Draft Convention on the Legal Status
of the Aircraft Commander (Draft Convention), which appeared on the agenda of the First ICAO Assembly in 1947.123 In

particular, Article 2 of this proposed treaty delineated the operational authority of the aircraft commander, providing that during flight the aircraft commander(a) shall be in charge of the aircraft, the crew, the passengers,
and the cargo; (b) has the right and the duty to control and direct the crew and the passengers to the full extent necessary to
ensure order and safety; (c) has the right, for good reason, to
119Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention defines "pilot-in-command" as "the pilot responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time" and
charges him with responsibility "for the operation and safety of the aeroplane
and for the safety of all persons on board during flight time." ICAO, Operation of
Aircraft, Annex 6 to the Convention on InternationalCivil Aviation, Part I, International
Commercial Air Transport-Aeroplanes,ICAO Doc. ICAO.ANX.6 (8th ed. 2006); see
also Russell Kane & Tony Pyne, The Legal Status and Liability of the Copilot (pt. 1), 19
AIR & SPACE L. 290, 291 (1994) (noting that "Annex 6 is liberal in ascribing responsibilities and duties to the pilot in command, [but] it is silent on the subject
of his authority.").
120 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, supra note 101, at 6; see also van Wijk, supra
note 97, at 325 (discussing efforts of ICAO's Air Navigation Commission to address the issue of whether a pilot-in-command has the legal authority necessary to
fulfill his Annex 6 responsibilities); cf DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 45, at 35
(noting that "the Annexes of the Chicago Convention contain a number of recommendations regarding the commander's conduct, but although they are usually observed in practice they do not have force of law").
121 Paris Convention, supra note 48, art. 32, 11 L.N.T.S. at 195.
122 See MArE, supra note 19, at 282; see also MILDE, supra note 45, at 67-69
(discussing ICAO's authority to legislate in the form of Standards and Recommended Practices on any issues relating to military aircraft); cf van Wijk, supra
note 97, at 334 (noting that "the majority of the [1980 ICAO Panel of Experts on
the Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander] felt... no further authority should
be delegated to the aircraft commander, warning having been given in the Panel
that a solution of certain problems would be closely related to matters of national
sovereignty"); Kane & Pyne, supra note 119, at 291 ("The authority of the pilot in
command, or of the commander as he may be termed, is more likely to be established by [domestic legislation].").
123 ICAO, Draft Convention on the Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander (as revised
at Paris by the Legal ad hoc Committee), ICAO Doc. 4006 (1947) [hereinafter Draft
Convention], available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/aOl/commission4.html.
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disembark any number of the crew, or passengers at an intermediate stop; [and] (d) has disciplinary power over members of the
crew within the scope of their duties, in case of necessity, of
which he shall be sole judge, he may assign temporarily any
member of the crew to duties other than those for which he is
engaged.' 2 4
Remarkably, the legal status of the aircraft commander has
been under official consideration by ICAO since this draft ac1 25
cord was introduced, albeit perhaps not always actively so.
Yet, aside from those aspects of aircraft-commander authority
focused on preventive action against hijackers that were broken
out and ultimately incorporated into the 1963 Tokyo Convention, 12 6 there has actually been little substantive change to the
principles espoused in the 1947 Draft Convention's theoretical
framework.1 27 In point of fact, while an actual convention on
128
the legal status of the aircraft commander remains in limbo,
Professor Diederiks-Verschoor has suggested that, based on custom and practice, the operational powers and responsibilities of
124

Id. art. 2.

See Gerald F. Fitzgerald, The Development of InternationalRules Concerning Offenses and Other Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 242
n. 2 6 (1963); van Wijk, supra note 97, passim; DIEDERIKS-VFRSClHOOR, supra note 45,
at 33-34.
126 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention], reprinted in Maria Buzdugan, "Chicago" Acts and Related Protocols,XXX-1
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 183 (2005). Articles 5 through 10 of the Tokyo Convention give the aircraft commander the power "to subdue and assert control over an
individual who commits a criminal act or an act that jeopardizes the safety of the
aircraft or persons or property thereon .... DEMPSEY, supra note 43, at 239; see
also 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: TERRORISM IN WORLD COUNTRIES 46 (Verinder Grover ed., 2002).
Under the Tokyo Convention of 1963 a pilot-in-command has been
given powers that he can take any preventive action against hijackers or any other criminal on board the aircraft, so as to ensure the
safety of [the] aircraft and its occupants. This convention defines
offences against penal law, and applies to aircraft in flight or over
high seas and in any area outside the territory of a state.
125

127

See Fitzgerald, supra note 125;

DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR,

supra note 45, at

33-34.
128 See van Wijk, supra note 97, at 334.
It can be noted that the majority of the [1980 ICAO Panel of Experts on the Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander] felt that...
no further authority should be delegated to the aircraft commander, warning having been given in the Panel that a solution of
certain problems would be closely related to matters of national
sovereignty.
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the aircraft commander
including:

can be

generally

categorized

as

(1) The responsibility for the condition of the aircraft and the
welfare of the crew, the preparations for the flight[,] and its
successful completion ....

[This] includes the commander's

duty to obtain the proper flight documents and the cargo
manifests, to carry out pre-takeoff checks, etc.
(2) The right ...

to issue strict orders to crew and passengers

(3) [T]he authority to undertake all necessary measures to ensure the safe completion of the flight ....
(4) [And the authority to] decide[ ] whether and in what way to
search and rescue operations in the
render assistance in 129
event of an accident.
Though these civil air law precepts are not binding on military aviation,13 ° they are notably manifest in national guidelines
that circumscribe military aircraft commander authority. For
example, in accordance with U.S. military regulations governing
flight rules and operations procedures for various types of mobility aircraft, an aircraft commander (or pilot-in-command) is
designated on the orders for all flights.13 ' Regulations further
empower the individual so-designated with a full array of authorities and responsibilities relative to flight operations of the air129

See

DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR,

supra note 45, at 34-35. According to Dr.

Diederiks-Verschoor, the powers and responsibilities of aircraft commanders also
include the duty to register births and deaths and authority to perform marriages
and oversee the drawing up of wills on board the aircraft. Id. at 34; cf. MATTE,
supra note 19, at 292 ("The activities of the aircraft commander are numerous
and diverse, requiring .. . the commander's presence during certain events beyond human control [that] may occur on board the aircraft, such as births or
deaths during the flight .... "); but see Ludovico M. Bentivoglio, Conflicts Problems

in Air Law, in 119

RECUEIL DE COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE AcAD-

69, 120 (No. 3, 1966):
States are
With respect to [births, deaths, and marriages], ...
scarcely willing to entrust the aircraft's commander with an authority comparable to the one generally recognized to the captain of a
sea-going vessel. In fact, the above-mentioned draft convention on
the legal status of the air commander, prepared by [ICAO], confined the function of the said commander, in the matter of status
changes occurring on board, to the recording of births and deaths
only.
130 See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also HAANAPPEL, supra note
53, at 44.
131 See AFI 11-202V3, supra note 97, at 23.
EMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
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craft, which, for the most part, parallel those ascribed to their
civil aviation counterparts (see Table 1).132
Table 1. Aircraft Commander Operational Authorities & Responsibilities.
International Custom & Practice
(1) The responsibility for the condition of the
aircraft and the welfare of the crew, the
preparations for the flight and its successful
completion, to include the duty to obtain proper
flight documents and the cargo manifests, to
carry out pre-flight checks, etc.

U.S. DoD & Air Force Regulations
Aircraft commanders are:
Responsible for ensuring airworthiness of the
aircraft, within limits established by the flight
manual and the operating procedures established
by the lead command, before flight.
Responsible for the welfare of aircrew members,
Mission Essential Ground Personnel (MEGP), and
passengers.
* Responsible for verifying diplomatic clearance
requirements prior to departure.
* Responsible for compliance with requirements for
transport of hazardous materials.

(2) The authority to issue strict orders to crew and
passengers.
(3) The authority to undertake all necessary
measures to ensure the safe completion of the
flight.

(4) The authority to decide whether and how to
render assistance in search and rescue operations
in the event of an accident,

In command of all persons aboard the aircraft (to
include all military personnel regardless of rank).
Responsible for the safe accomplishment of the
mission.
(Note: In the case of air-to-air refueling tankers,
aircraft commanders' responsibilities include
ensuring separation between the tanker and the
receiver aircraft.)
* Authorized to refuse/delay a mission for safety
reasons.
* Authorized to disclose classified information if
necessary to avoid endangering the flight.
* The final authority for requesting or accepting
aircrew or mission waivers.
Authorized to render emergency assistance to a
person, ship, or aircraft, whose position within the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters of another
state is reasonably well known, and is in danger or
distress because of perils of the sea.

In practical terms, military aircraft commander authority can
thus be viewed as effectively having two elements: the first emanating from the sovereignty of military aircraft and the flag na-

tion's delegation of jurisdictional authority and thereby placing
the aircraft commander in the role of representative of the air-

craft's "territorial sovereign;" and the second, generally delineated by domestic laws and regulations, relating to the aircraft
E.g., Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2 Mission Design Series (MDS) Specific,
Volume 3, instructions cited supra note 98; AFI 11-202V3, supra note 97, at 23;
U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCEJOINT INSTRUCTION 11-204, OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT CARRYING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 2-3 (1994); U.S. OF132

FICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS), CJCSI INSTRUCTION
2410.01C, GUIDANCE FOR THE EXERCISE OF RIGHT-OF-AsSISTANCE ENTRY 1-3

(2007).
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commander's technical functions.' 33 Normally, these two elements of aircraft commander authority are exercised seamlessly
and in tandem. However, military aircraft are also normally operated by the armed forces of the flag nation, in which case the
flag nation alone commands and controls the aircraft and its
crew through a single national military command structure empowered with the legal authority to issue orders and compel
obedience. In contrast, the commander of a foreign flagged
state aircraft can be subject to multiple chains of command
(e.g., a "multinational command authority overseeing the operation" and his own "national command authority"), as well as
multiple regulatory authorities with variations of rules pertaining to his conduct as the aircraft commander and/or operation
of the aircraft. 134 This dichotomy, along with some of the
unique organizational aspects of the SAC partnership, arguably
places the SAC C-17 aircraft commander in a position of all-butinevitable conflict.
IV.

THE SAC PARTNERSHIP ANOMALY

Recall that international law has not settled on a common definition for either state or military aircraft; thus, while some states
might steadfastly characterize any aircraft owned, marked, and
operated by the armed forces of a nation as a state/military aircraft per se, for others the legal status of an aircraft as state/
military could depend on the particulars of a given flight and/
or whether the aircraft operator is reimbursed for the flight by a
third party.13 5 Because of the NAEW&CF's standing as a full
NATO Command headquarters and the unquestionably military
character of the C2ISR mission, the question of the status of the
E-3A Component's AWACS aircraft is largely moot. However,
the same cannot necessarily be said of the SAC C-17s. In contrast to the distinctively military AWACS aircraft, which have
been described as "a militarised Boeing 707 with a rotating disklike rotodome housing a long-range radar attached to its fuse133 Cf Kane & Pyne, supra note 119, at 290-92 (noting that the authority of the
commercial aircraft commander has multiple dimensions, to include those
granted pursuant the Chicago Convention and its Annexes and other international air law instruments, those established by domestic legislation, and, finally,
those that arise from his contracts with his employer).
134 CANNA, supra note 12, at 7-8.
135 See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
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military air transport technologies like the C-17 have

largely identical civil equivalents. 137 Indeed, "the ease with
which civil aircraft [and, particularly, transport aircraft] could
be converted to military use and vice-versa" has been a sticking
point for jurists, scholars, diplomats, and statesmen concerned
with the formation of international air law and the distinction
between "civil" and "military" aircraft since the very inception of
aviation. 13 8

Depiction of the Boeing BC-17X aircrafta proposed commercial variant of the C-17
(Photo: http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/gallery/images/mdl 7/inflighI.html)
NATO, AWACS: NATO's EEs IN THE SKY, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/topics_48904.htm; see also AFI 10-420, supra note 35 ("Combat air
forces" consist of "[a] ir forces that are directly engaged in combat operations," to
include, inter alia, "command and control;... and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance aircraft.").
137 See, e.g., Press Release, Boeing, MD-17 Receives FAA Certification (Aug. 28,
1997), available at http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/ 1997/news-release_
970828n.html (on airworthiness certification of Boeing's MD-17-a commercial
variant of the C-17); Press Release, Boeing, Boeing is Undisputed Leader In Providing Air Cargo Capacity (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.boeing.com/
news/releases/2000/news release_000928a.html (announcing Boeing's BC-17X,
formerly known as the MD-17); Brochure, Boeing, BC-17/C-17A Airport Compatibility 2 (2005), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/airports/acaps/bc17-cl7abrochure.pdf (providing airport compatibility information for the BC-17 aircraft-"a commercial variant of the C-17A sharing the same external
dimensions").
138 MILDE, supra note 45, at 63; see generally id. at 60-74.
136
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Furthermore, as noted before, the SAC partnership's operational arrangement, whereby its NAMO-owned C-17 aircraft
bear Hungarian Air Force markings and purportedly function as
Hungarian state aircraft-though similar to that of the NATO E3A Component, whose multinational AWACS aircraft fly under
the flag of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg-is nonetheless
distinguishable because neither the SAC partnership nor its operational arm, the HAW, is a NATO organization nor, for that
matter, has a legal personality." 9 SAC participants therefore independently determine for themselves how to best make use of
their flight hours. Additionally, inasmuch as the SAC partnership was created and continues to function outside the auspices
of NATO, it does not share the legal personality or military character of the alliance's command structure,"' nor is it in and of
itself a military organization. 141 And while the HAW is generally
described as "a multinational military unit," 142 it likewise lacks
any legal status whereby its operations in furtherance of the "national requirements" and/or "multinational commitments" of
its participants can be deemed military per se. 14 3 Consequently,
when viewed in light of the ambiguities in the international air
law regime relative to the classification of state and military aircraft discussed previously, the SAC partnership's organizational
construct can actually serve to obfuscate the legal status of its C17 aircraft and, therefore, the associated authorities of its aircraft commanders as well, and so may make both more open to
question.
Perhaps recognizing the shortcomings of this arrangement
and the potential implications for the status of SAC C-17 aircraft, SAC architects seemingly sought to clarify the matter
through the partnership's foundational document, the SAC
MOU. To start with, the MOU specifies that the SAC C-17s "will
not be used for commercial purposes or controlled by commercial entities." 4 ' Though this prohibition appears to simply reinforce usage restrictions imposed via the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program under which two of the three SAC C-17s

139
140
141

142
143
144

SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 19.1.2.
See id. § 5.3.
Id. § 3.1.1.

Id. § 2.
See id. §§ 3.1.1, 19.1.2.
Id. § 3.1.1.
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were acquired,1 45 whereby any transfer or change in the end-use
of any U.S.-origin defense article acquired through the FMS program is prohibited without U.S. government approval,' 46 it may
nonetheless also be viewed as reflecting an underlying agreement among participants to altogether exclude commercial uses
from the scope of SAC C-17 operations. The MOU further
states: "The C-17 aircraft will be marked and registered in accordance with the appropriate laws and regulations of the Flag Nation. The C-1 7 aircraft are considered state aircraft for military
purposes of the Flag Nation.... The Flag Nation will serve as
' 47
the operating nation.'

Based on the foregoing provisions, the intent of participant
nations to confer state (military) aircraft status on the SAC C-17s
may therefore be unambiguous. However, much like the status
of military aircraft under international law generally, the legal
status actually afforded the SAC aircraft by virtue of these terms
is neither "particularly transparent" nor "unequivocal,"' 48 since
ultimately, by operation of the MOU, their status can only be
conclusively established by looking to the domestic law of the
flag nation-i.e., the Republic of Hungary.149
Hungarian national requirements for the registration and
marking of state aircraft are actually set forth in part 3, chapter
1, sections 12 through 18, of the country's Air Traffic Act
(Act),' 5 as supplemented by certain government and Minister
of Defense decrees.' 15 ' Specifically, the Act provides that respon145 The first of the three SAC C-17s was furnished by the U.S. as a non-financial
contribution to the SAC partnership in accordance with the SAC MOU. Id.
§ 8.5.1.1; see also Department of Defense Participation in Strategic Airlift Capability Partnership, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1032(d), 122 Stat. 306 (2008).
146 See DEF. INST. OF SEC. ASSISTANCE MGMT. (DISAM), THE MANAGEMENT OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE 1-2, 2-8 (Gregory W. Sutton & Kenneth W. Martin eds., 27th
ed. 2007), available at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/27th%2OGreenbook.pdf [hereinafter DISAM GREENBOOK] (providing a detailed examination of
the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program and the purpose of arms sales).
147 SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 14.1.
148 See MILDE, supra note 45, at 61.
149 See Col. Frank Fedele, Overflight by Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 9 A.F.
JAG L. REv. 8, 14 (1967) (citing MvREs S. McDoUGAL, ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC
ORDER IN OUTER SPACE 568 (1963)).
150 Act XCVII of 1995 on Air Traffic (1996) (Hung.) [hereinafter Air Traffic
Act].
151 Gov't Decree No. 141/1995 (30.11.) on the implementation of Act 97 of
1995 governing Air Traffic (1996) (Hung.) [hereinafter Hung. Gov't Decree No.
141/1995]; see also Decree of the Minister of Defence No. 21/1998 (12.21.) on
registration, manufacture, repair, and airworthiness certification of state-owned
aircraft (1998) (Hung.) [hereinafter Hung. MOD Decree No. 21/1998].
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sibility for state aircraft, including registration, rests with the Directorate of Air Transport of Hungary's National Transport
Authority,
acting in its capacity as "Military Air Affairs Authority."'15 2 Moreover, although the Act generally equates "state air' it implicitly allows
craft" with aircraft that are "state-owned,"153
for aircraft other than state-owned aircraft to "qualify" as Hungarian state aircraft provided they are duly registered by the Military Air Affairs Authority in both the national aircraft registry
and the Authority's own aircraft registry. 154
The SAC C-17s have, in fact, been registered by the Hungarian Military Air Affairs Authority so as to qualify as Hungarian state aircraft under the Act, and therefore bear
appropriate markings. 55 However, as alluded to previously, the
lack of international consensus on the definition of military aircraft means that it is conceivable that even if the SAC aircraft
were to be (by operation of the MOU) considered part of the
Hungarian armed forces, they can nevertheless be classified as
civil if used for what some might characterize as a "civil
flight."' 56 Obviously, the same thing could possibly be said
about any apparently military aircraft, including the NATO
AWACS aircraft; 57 but, once more, the character of a flight as
military or civil is more amorphous in the case of transport aircraft like the C-17 and is further complicated here by the absence of any specific common-usage standard among SAC
participants, as well as by the lack of legal status on the part of
either the SAC or its operational subdivision, the HAW. The
bottom line, therefore, is that without a definitive statement of
the Hungarian government's position on whether and under
what circumstances state/military aircraft may be classified as
152 Hung. Gov't Decree No. 141/1995, supra note 151, §§ 2(1) (a), 2(3) (b); see
also Hung. MOD Decree No. 21/1998, supra note 151, § 4.
'53 Hung. MOD Decree No. 21/1998, supra note 151, § 1.
154 Air Traffic Act, supra note 150, § 12. Notably, U.S. law, in contrast, exempts
"aircraft of the national defense forces of the United States" from FAA aircraft
registration requirements. 49 U.S.C. § 44101 (2006).
155 Republic of Hung., Nat'l Transp. Auth., Dir. for Air Transp., Certificate of
Registration No. 56/301 (Jul. 14, 2009); Republic of Hung., Nat'l Transp. Auth.,
Dir. for Air Transp., Certificate of Registration No. 56/302 (Sep. 17, 2009); Republic of Hung., Nat'l Transp. Auth., Dir. for Air Transp., Certificate of Registration No. 56/303 (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with author); see also Air Traffic Act, supra
note 150, § 18.
156 Bourbonniere & Haeck, supra note 45, at 904; see also supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
157 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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civil, the SAC C-17s' registration and markings cannot be
deemed to conclusively establish their legal status.
Because the aircraft commander's international standing and
authority as representative of the flag nation derive from the status of military aircraft as sovereign instrumentalities, any uncertainty over the legal classification of the SAC C-17s as military or
civil could have major implications for foreign pilots commanding the aircraft, as well as for SAC nations utilizing the aircraft to
meet their strategic airlift needs. Consider that consistent with
U.S. policy a military pilot commanding a U.S. Air Force (USAF)
C-17 is at all times vested with sovereign authority, to include the
power to exercise executive jurisdiction and assert state aircraft
privileges or immunities on behalf of the flag nation. 158 This
enables the aircraft commander to act semi-autonomously
within the limits of his authority in responding to excessive
claims of sovereignty or jurisdictional rights by foreign states
that can threaten the success of both the airlift mission and the
overall operation it is supporting. For instance, in the case of a
C-17 transiting international airspace en route to deliver a field
hospital to the site of a natural disaster, a delay in flight time for
rerouting or to ask permission to overfly necessitated by excessive maritime claims that are inconsistent with, or in direct violation of, international law could not only cause the aircraft to
miss its landing time slot and thereby prevent timely delivery of
the medical supplies and personnel, but could, in turn, also lead
to the deaths of disaster victims in need of acute care. Continu-

ously armed with sovereign authority, the commander of a
USAF C-17 could assuredly invoke the "due regard" prerogative
for state aircraft under such circumstances to keep the mission

on track, 15 9 whereas doubt over the status of aircraft under Hun158 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
159As state aircraft, military aircraft are not bound by ICAO rules and procedures. Chicago Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(a)-(b). U.S. policy requires
DoD aircraft operating in international airspace to follow ICAO flight procedures
whenever practical and compatible with mission requirements, but recognizes
that certain operational situations may not lend themselves to these procedures.
Flights conducted under the "due regard" prerogative must provide a level of
safety equivalent to that normally given by ICAO air traffic control agencies and
fulfill U.S. government obligations under Article 3 of the Chicago Convention to
show "'due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."' U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 4540.01, USE OF INTERNATIONAL
AIRSPACE BY U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND FOR MISSILE/PROJECTILE FIRINGS,

(2007); see also U.S.

1 6.3.2

DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NAT'L GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FLIGHT INFORMATION PUBLICATION, GENERAL PLANNING,
8-7 (2009); FOREIGN CLEARANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, C2.2 (2009).
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garian law, whether, for example, due to the nature of the flight
or the possibility of third-party imbursement for the flight
hours, might inhibit the ability of that pilot, or otherwise make
him reluctant to do so, when at the controls of SAC C-17, and
thereby jeopardize the mission.
Furthermore, even if the status of the SAC C-17s as state/military aircraft is presumed established, for U.S. military pilots, in
particular, commanding a foreign flagged state aircraft presents
additional legal concerns that go beyond the potential vagaries
of the aircraft's legal character. Namely, the Emoluments
Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States],
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State.""16 This provision was intended
to "preserv[e] foreign Ministers and other officers of the U.S.
independent of external influence" by foreign governments, 16 '
and applies to officers in both foreign and military service.162
As alluded to at the outset, the United States has promulgated
policies with respect to command and control of American
forces participating in multinational organizations and partnerships. "63
' However, these rules are primarily aimed at reinforcing the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution, which
requires that the chain-of-command over the nation's military
forces that flows from the President of the United States to U.S.
commanders in the field remain inviolate, even in an alliance or
coalition setting. 64 Here, command authority over U.S. forces
contributed to the HAW is not per se an issue, since, in accordance with the MOU, the HAW commander is given only "operational control" of forces, while "command authority" is
retained by the contributing SAC participant. 65 The RAW command structure is thus consistent with the Commander-in-Chief
Clause and implementing policies, whereby the President holds
160 U.S. CONST.

2

art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).

1787 389 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (notes of James Madison); see also id. at 327 ("It was thought
proper, in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any
one in office from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign states."
(remarks of Governor Randolph)).
162 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President commissions "all the Officers of
the United States.").
163 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also Exec. Summary, supra note 13, at 808.
165SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 16.
161

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

2012]

MUL TINA TIONAL AIRLIFT FLEET

143

"the ultimate and undelegable (outside the [U.S.] military command structure) power"' 6 6 to deploy U.S. forces, assign missions,
organize and equip units, promote military personnel, and administer discipline, but can still place appropriate forces under
the temporary control of foreign commanders for specific operations (e.g., U.N. peace operations). 167
Once again, however, by the terms of the SAC MOU, the Consortium's C-17s are to be operated as military aircraft of the flag
nation, the Republic of Hungary, and, as the flag nation, Hungary is further affirmatively obliged to assume international responsibility for the aircraft and enforce all state aircraft
privileges and immunities vis-d-vis third countries. 16 It must be
emphasized that "[e]ach aircraft can have only one nationality
[and] . . . [s]tate aircraft, including military aircraft, have the
nationality of the State [that] owns and uses them in public service, in accordance with recognized principles of customary international law applicable to warships."' 69 Hence, the mantle of
Hungarian sovereign authority, which by virtue of the status of
military aircraft as sovereign instrumentalities is embroidered
with the title "aircraft commander," effectively attaches to U.S.
military pilots when commanding HAW missions.170 While this
authority is in place only for a specific time or mission in the
same manner as operational control,' 7 1 because it flows directly
from the Republic of Hungary to the aircraft commander as a
manifestation of the exclusivity of flag-nation jurisdiction
aboard the aircraft, it falls outside the HAW command and con166 J. William Snyder, Jr., "Command" versus "OperationalControl": A Critical Review of PDD-25, (1995), http://www.ibiblio.org/jwsnyder/wisdom/pdd25.html.
167 Exec. Summary, supra note 13, at 807-08.
168 SAC MOU, supra note 11, §§ 14.1, 14.3, 14.5.
'Fedele, supra note 149.
170 See id. at 14 n.34.
The Chicago Convention assumes that aircraft are legal entities and
directly recognizes the States as the guarantor of the conduct of the
aircraft possessing its nationality as well as the protector of such
aircraft. At the time of the Chicago Convention, customary international air law had so completely accepted the concept of nationality of aircraft that there was no question respecting the nationality
of State aircraft.
See alsoJohn C. Cooper, National Status of Aircraft, 17J. AIR L. & CoM. 292, 307
(1950). Afortiori similar rights and responsibilities flow from the state to its state
aircraft. Cf MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 494-95 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the status of a warship as "a direct arm of the sovereign of the flag state");
see also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
l7 See Exec. Summary, supra note 13, at 808 (defining operational control).
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trol framework agreed to in the MOU. 1 72 Moreover, though a

U.S. pilot serving as aircraft commander aboard a SAC C-17 aircraft receives no remuneration from the Hungarian government, 17 3 the position of aircraft commander on a military
aircraft in and of itself "'contain[s] elements comparable to accepting an office from a foreign government,' including 'duties
and responsibilities' . . . comparable to that owed by an officer
or employee of a government.' 1 74 Therefore, to the extent that

the duties and responsibilities that the pilot owes to Hungary in
his capacity as aircraft commander-such as, for example, the
duty to ensure observance of flag-nation (i.e., Hungarian) law
on board the aircraft1

7

-could conflict with his role as an of-

type
ficer of the United States, the arrangement may beget the
176
Clause.
Emoluments
the
by
forbidden
loyalty
divided
of
V.

A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCT

For states that adhere to a restrictive definition of state/military aircraft, as does the United States, for example, the legal
status of the SAC C-17 aircraft as state/military is, for the most
part, self-evident, based primarily on the fact that the aircraft
bear military markings and are commanded over and operated
by armed forces members, etc.177 But again, since neither the
SAC nor the HAW has a legal personality unto itself and by operation of the SAC MOU the Consortium's C-17s function as Hungarian state/military aircraft, the question of whether and under
what circumstances these aircraft may be classified as civil must
take into account currently prevailing laws and policies of the
Republic of Hungary, as the flag nation.

78

Thus, to the extent

172 Compare SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 16 (HAW command and control), with
§§ 14.7.1, 14.8.1 (flag-nation delegations of authority with respect to foreign officials and transport of armed military personnel aboard SAC C-17 aircraft).
173 See SAC MOU, supra note 11, §§ 15.5.1, 21.3.
174 Memorandum opinion from Daniel Koffsky, Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John E. Huerta, Gen.
Counsel, Smithsonian Institution (May 24, 2001), availableat http://wwv.justice.
gov/olc/smithsonianwb.htm [hereinafter DOJ Emoluments Clause Memo]; see
also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
175 Even to the possible exclusion of contrary U.S. law.
176 DOJ Emoluments Clause Memo, supra note 174. But see Memorandum
from J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to S. A. Andretta, Admin. Assistant Attorney Gen. 8 (Oct. 4, 1954)
("[T]he term 'emolument' . ..was intended to cover compensation of any sort
arising out of an employment relationshipwith a foreign state." (emphasis added)).
177 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
178See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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there is uncertainty relating to the legal status of the SAC aircraft and, therefore, with respect to the associated authorities of
the aircraft commanders as well, it is chiefly attributable to the
absence of any national or international legal personality on the
part of either the SAC or the HAW and the corresponding lack
of a transparent basis or touchstone upon which to conclusively
establish the status of the aircraft as state/military.
One way whereby the status of the SAC aircraft as state/military could be solidified and rendered more transparent would
be to bring the RAW under the NATO umbrella, A la NATO's
NAEW&CF E-3A Component, so that the HAW could similarly
participate in the international legal personality of NATO.' 79
And, though the participation of non-NATO member states Finland and Sweden in the Consortium would certainly portend
this to be more easily said than done, there is another NATOmultinational military partnership whose structure could well be
adopted to accomplish this end. Specifically, SAC participants
could look to the arrangement in place between NATO and the
Eurocorps as a model for a new NATO-HAW framework.
The Eurocorps is a by-product of the Franco-German Treaty
signed in Paris in 1963, commonly known as the Treaty of
Elysee, wherein the parties committed to collaboration in the
field of defense as a means of enhancing post-war reconciliation
between the two countries, which, in turn, led to the creation of
the Franco-German Brigade in 1989.10 In 1992, this unit, com-

prising French and German elements, was opened for participation from other member states of the Western European Union
(WEU)-then the defense arm of the EU-and was redubbed
the Eurocorps. 8s' The Eurocorps officially stood-up on October
1, 1993, when Lieutenant General Helmut Willmann of Germany became its first Commanding General.18 2 At its inception,
the Eurocorps had just three members (Germany, France, and
Belgium); however, it has since expanded to five states with the
179

See supra note 26.

180 Eurocorps, Eurocorps' History 1 (Jan. 9, 2005),

available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/eurocorpshistory_/
eurocorps-history-en.pdf [hereinafter Eurocorps' History].
181 Id.; see also generally Eurocorps, History of HQ Eurocorps 1, http://www.
eurocorps.net/pdf/eng/History-ofjthe-Eurocorps.pdf [hereinafter History of
HQ Eurocorps].
182 History of HQ Eurocorps, supra note 181, at 2; see also Eurocorps' History, supra
note 180, at 2; see also DIETER FLECK &c STUART ADDY, ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 34 (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 2001) (noting that the
Eurocorps did not achieve "operational readiness" until November 30, 1995).
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additions of Spain and Luxembourg, as the multinational unit
has evolved into a crisis response force under the permanent
command of the European Union.'8 3 Simultaneously, the
Eurocorps' relationship with NATO has also significantly
evolved.
The Eurocorps' association with NATO was initially defined in
a formal agreement signed on January 21, 1993, between French
Chief of Staff Admiral Jacques Lanxade, his German counterpart, General Klaus Naumann, and the NATO Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) General John Shalikashvili,
which is commonly referred to as the SACEUR Agreement. The
SACEUR Agreement spelled out conditions for employment of
the Eurocorps in support of NATO with a view toward collective
self-defense missions arising under article 5 of the Washington
(NATO) Treaty, i" 4 but did not contemplate the Eurocorps involvement in "out-of-area activities."'11 In the decade that followed, however, the Eurocorps transformed to become one of
six NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-i.e., a "[h]igh [r]eadiness
[h]eadquarters" that can be deployed at short notice to lead
NATO forces on missions wherever they are needed, "within or
beyond the territory of NATO member states."' 86 Plus, upon receiving NATO certification as a Rapid Deployable Corps in
2002, the Eurocorps was opened to all NATO member nations,
and several NATO members actually integrated personnel into
its headquarters staff. 187 More recently, Poland has entered into
the process to becoming the sixth "framework (full member)
183 History of HQEurocorps,supra note 181, at 2-3; see European Parliament Resolution of 5 June 2008 on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
and ESDP (2008/2003(INI)), 2009 OJ. (C 285E) 23.
184 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S.
243, 246.
185 ANAND MENON, FRANCE, NATO, AND THE LIMITS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1981-97:
THE POLITICS OF AMBIVALENCE 44 (2000).

186 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,

The Rapid Deployable Corps: Com-

manding NATO Troops on Missions Wherever Necessary, http://wwv.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/topics_50088.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Rapid
Deployable Corps] (on file with author); see also History of HQ Eurocorps, supra note
181, at 3 (noting that "[i]n 2002, NATO evaluated the [Eurocorps'] general capabilities and its operational capability in several steps" and certified the Eurocorps
as a "Rapid Reaction Force HQ").
187 In 2002-03, personnel from NATO member nations Canada, Greece, Poland, and Turkey joined the Eurocorps' staff; liaison officers from Italy, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were also detailed to the headquarters.
Eurocorps'History,supra note 180, at 3; History of HQEurocorps,supranote 181, at 3.

2012]

M UL TINA TIONAL AIRLIT FLEET

147

nation," and the United States, Italy, and Romania have all submitted applications for incorporation. 8
Yet, during this same period, the Eurocorps witnessed increased participation from non-NATO EU-member states as
well, with the addition to the headquarters staff of officers from
Austria and Finland.1 89 Furthermore, the Eurocorps remains at
the disposal of the EU for crisis response operations and, by virtue of the 2009 Treaty of Strasbourg,""t also maintains its own
legal personality and, with it, operational autonomy to include
command responsibility and authority over "[issuing bids for
and procuring] materials and personnel, as well as environmental, workforce[,] and many other operational issues."1 9 ' Moreover, its status as a NATO headquarters notwithstanding, the
Eurocorps remains outside NATO's integrated military structure
and "any commitment of the Eurocorps requires an exclusive
decision of the member states, Belgium, France, Germany, Lux1 92
embourg[,] and Spain.'
Were the SAC to adopt the Eurocorps model, the RAW too
could become a NATO headquarters and thereby share in the
alliance's international legal personality, 9 3 which would address
the legal ambiguities surrounding the authority and responsibil188 Press Release, Eurocorps, The Treaty of Strasbourg Confirms Eurocorps as
a Pioneer in European Defence 1 (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://
w w.eurocorps.org/news.php?id-news=787 [hereinafter Press Release (Treaty of
Strasbourg) ].
189 Eurocorps' History, supra note 180, at 3; see also History of HQ Eurocorps, supra
note 181, at 3.
190On February 26, 2009, the Treaty of Strasbourg entered into force after the
parliaments of the Eurocorps "Framework Nations" (Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, and Spain) ratified the text of the agreement that had been signed
by their respective ministers of defense in Brussels on November 22, 2004, which
designated the Eurocorps as a rapid reaction force placed at the disposal of the
EU for purposes of carrying out the missions set forth in the Petersberg Declaration (named for the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn, Germany, where the meeting
took place). See Press Release (Treaty of Strasburg), supranote 188, at 1. The socalled Petersberg missions include: "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management." Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union Council of Ministers 6, Jun. 19, 1992, available
at http://ww.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.
191Press Release (Treaty of Strasbourg), supra note 188, at 1.
192 Rapid Deployable Corps, supra note 186.
193 See SHERROD L. BUMGARDNER ET AL., NATO LEcAL DESKBOOK 106-07
(Zolt~in Hegedfus et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (Entities established by NATO nations
outside the NATO command structure (such as "MOU-organizations") may be
granted international status under the Protocol on the Status of International
Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Aug. 28,
1952, 5 U.S.T. 870, T.I.A.S. No. 2978, 200 U.N.T.S. 340, reprinted in 48 AM.J. INT'L
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ities of SAC C-17 aircraft commanders in two significant ways.
First, the matter of the legal status of the SAC C-17 aircraft
would be simplified, as HAW operations would ostensibly be subsumed into, and take on the military character of, NATO's collective defense function. The aircraft would therefore be more
clearly categorized as military-and the officers in command
would hence exercise military aircraft commander authorityregardless of the nature of any particular mission or its beneficiary. Second, attaching NATO's legal personality to the HAW
would also likely resolve the question of whether placing U.S.
military pilots in command of Hungarian flagged SAC aircraft
violates the Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution in favor
of the pilots being able to lawfully perform this function. The
U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has recognized that "[a] n international organization in which the United States participates
... is not a 'foreign State' under the Emoluments Clause."' 94 In

arriving at this conclusion, the DoJ opined that when "the
United States has determined that [an] organization plays an
important role in carrying out [U.S.] foreign policy" and so,
"participates in the governance of the organization and undertakes a leadership role in its decisionmaking," participation of
U.S. officers or employees in the organization "[does] not directly raise the concerns about divided loyalty that the Emoluments Clause was designed to address.

' 195

Thus, if HAW

operations were conducted under the NATO umbrella, any
Emoluments Clause concerns would arguably be eliminated,
since U.S. military pilots would not be directly in command of a
foreign military aircraft per se, but would instead be fulfilling
the U.S. role in NATO "as approved by Congress. "196
At the same time, adoption of the Eurocorps model would
serve the interest of the SAC Consortium and, particularly, the
non-NATO participants, in preserving the HAW's operational
autonomy, just as it does for framework nations and participating non-NATO EU countries with the Eurocorps. Under this
alternative type of arrangement, "entities that are established by
NATO nations outside NATO command structure [such as
'MOU-organizations']

.

.

.

remain under control and are

L. 163 (1954) [hereinafter Paris Protocol], and "are considered to form part of
NATO command activities without being included in the command structure.").
194 DOJ Emoluments Clause Memo, supra note 174, at 1.
195 Id. at 2.
196Id.; but see sources cited supra note 149.
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resourced by the Nations establishing them."' 9 7 Additionally,
the SAC MOU currently allows only Hungary, as the flag nation,
to veto use of the SAC C-17 aircraft in cases where it deems the
198
mission inconsistent with its international legal obligations,
while an "opt out" provision affords the remaining SAC participants the ability to simply eschew participation in, as well as pecuniary liability (and, presumably, international responsibility)
for, HAW missions they object to on national security or vital
foreign policy grounds. 99 Following the Eurocorps model, however, employment of the HAW under NATO command could
instead be conditioned upon the approval of all Consortium
members. 2z °

This would ensure each SAC member, including

non-NATO nations, the ability to uphold its sovereign interests
and safeguard its material and monetary contributions to the
Consortium, while the "opt out" option could conceivably remain in place to provide individual participants an efficient
means to abstain from involvement in specific operations when
comparably less vital national interests are at stake.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the projected rise in global demand for strategic airlift,
many nations' future requirements for airlift will undoubtedly
exceed their individual capabilities. At the same time, in an era
of competing domestic priorities and tight budgets, nations are
promoting multinational projects for sharing or pooling of military assets and other joint military procurements as a way to
stretch their increasingly shrinking defense budgets. Availability
and cost effectiveness are therefore likely to drive future expansion and/or propagation of multinational projects for cooperative and/or shared use of "air mobility" assets, like the SAC
Consortium. So, while the SAC partnership and the question of
the legal status of its C-17 aircraft might at first be seen as a sui
generis case, issues related to the legal status of shared military
See BUMGARDNER, supra note 193, at 106.
198SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 17.8.
199 SAC MOU, supra note 11, § 17.10. This provision states that:
Any Participant may for national security or vital foreign policy reasons, opt out from a mission by notifying the HAW/CC, and inform
the Participants through the SAC SB prior to mission execution.
No personnel, including crewmembers, or cargo of the Participant
opting out will be onboard the C-17 aircraft during the execution
of such mission. The Participant opting out will not be associated
with any liability and claims paid as a result of that mission.
200 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
197
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aircraft and their implications for crew members and, especially,
the aircraft commander can be expected to take on increasing
importance to both the policymakers and the legal practitioners
behind these arrangements. The main purposes of this article
were to define the status and authority of the military aircraft
commander under international law and to show how the SAC
Consortium's organizational structure casts a shadow of doubt
on the certainty of the legal status of its aircraft and, hence, on
the status and authority of the military officers commanding
over the aircraft as well. It is hoped that this study will not only
positively contribute to the debate over the need to update the
existing air law regime and to seek resolution of lingering ambiguities like those surrounding the definition of state aircraft, but
will also encourage further research on the subject.

